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IMAGES OF CHINA IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

by

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IMAGES OF CHINA IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY MAKING

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ABSTRACT

This thesis tests the hypothesis that the U.S. policy makers—represented by Secretary of State Dean Acheson during the Truman Administration—adopted a hostile image of Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. To examine Acheson’s image of Communist China, the research used the content analysis method to analyze his statements, and a computer-based analysis program—DICTION 7.0—was used to obtain more objective evidence.

From analyzing the results—scores of the aggressive and optimistic tone in the statements regarding Communist China—the research showed that an aggressive tone significantly increased after the Chinese intervention, indicating a change in Acheson’s view of China. Although the optimistic tone in Acheson’s statements regarding Communist China did not significantly change, which suggests less support for the hypothesis, manual analysis of the statements was presented to explain the results; Acheson did not have an optimistic view of Communist China from the beginning, so there was little change even after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. With the supporting results and explanations, this thesis argues that Acheson did develop a hostile image of Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This research answers the question of when and why the U.S. policy makers adopted a hostile perception of China. It sets a hypothesis that the policy makers—represented by Secretary of State Dean Acheson during the Truman Administration—adopted a hostile image of Communist China only after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War and not after the Communist victory, nor the signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance. In an attempt to examine Acheson's view of Communist China, the research used the content analysis method to analyze his statements. To support the assessment, a computer based analysis program—DICTION 7.0—was used to obtain more objective evidence. By analyzing the results the program provided—the aggressive and optimistic tone in the statements regarding Communist China—the research found that an aggressive tone significantly increased after the Chinese intervention, indicating a change in China's image. Also, the research found that while the optimistic tone in the statements regarding Communist China did not significantly change, it concluded that there was a possibility that Acheson did not have an optimistic view of Communist China from the beginning. After analyzing official statements regarding Communist China, the research found that Acheson's view of China did shift after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and it was hostile. The research also found possible pre-existing perceptions Acheson had of the Chinese Communists, which were that China was a weak and less capable regime.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

As seen in the U.S.-China relationship, state images projected by the leadership of one country and the perception of these images by leadership of another country affect the fundamental attitude driving policies regarding each other. So by analyzing what view the leadership—the foreign policy makers—has of other states can be an important factor to understand why a particular policy was formed. China—once a weak, divided nation—suddenly obtained status as a major power in the international community during the twentieth century. Until rapprochement in 1972, the United States perceived China to

be a Soviet puppet. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the increasing economic rise of China has led to a concentration of attention from the rest of the world. Recently, the debate regarding whether the rise of China will be peaceful or lead to instability is increasing. Despite China's participation in the international community—in which they announced support for a peaceful and stable political environment—some U.S policy decision makers find it difficult to believe the Chinese due to their capabilities that appear to be designed to challenge U.S. influence in the Asian region. Regardless of China's intentions, as long as the United States perceives China as a threat, there will be obstacles that lead to competition or problems in future U.S-China relations.

This is a much-studied issue in international relations scholarship. David Shambaugh argues that images are important because people's interpretation of an event or phenomenon as a result, shapes the individual's subsequent behavior.¹ While Robert Jervis identifies the effects of mass information, he also suggests that an image of a subject dwells in the individual mind for a long period, and eventually influences the actions of the individual.² On a broader level, Michael Kulma notes that the state interaction is a function of how an issue is perceived by policy decision makers of the state.³

The issue of perceptions and images leads to the major research question. After Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the United States and the PRC had repeated conflict for the next twenty years. A new era of U.S-Sino relations opened only in 1972, when President Nixon arrived in Beijing. Before the twenty-year severance of diplomatic relations, when and why did the United States—the policy decision makers—adopt a hostile perception of China? This thesis will focus on one particular individual foreign policy maker—Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State during the Truman Administration—and will argue that despite the escalation in the

¹ David Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 17.

² Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 308.

³ Michael G. Kulma, "The Evolution of U.S. Images of China," *World Affairs* 162, no. 2 (1999), 76, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672574>.

conflicts between the United States and the People's Republic of China, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War was the main factor that caused the shift to a hostile image of China. The unexpected display of force by China (once perceived as weak and incapable), changed the image of China to one of an evil and barbaric communist imperialist.⁴

B. IMPORTANCE

There have been changes in Chinese and American views of each other throughout history. Shambaugh argues that a large gap exists in perceptions within U.S.-China relations. On the Chinese side, national disunity and impotence in the face of imperialist aggression for more than a century have left an indelible mark that leads to a deeply imbedded negative U.S image, and the Chinese America watchers are “blinded” by these very images.⁵ Various events and factors are responsible for this phenomenon. Different historical backgrounds and cultures can be a cause. Also, extremely different development experiences and values complicate forming mutual images of the other.

For almost twenty years, the United States viewed China as a dangerous adversary. The United States' general policy was to weaken and contain the Chinese Communist government. The leadership in Washington recognized China as an aggressor in the international community, and that Chinese expansionism threatened the security of its neighbors in East Asia. In order to contain China, the United States planned a line of military alliances along Chinese borders. The alliances included Japan, South Korea, and the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Supported by these allies, the United States established the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. The organization starting from Thailand and the Philippines, and with the additional ANZUS Treaty that added Australia, New Zealand, the United States formed a line that contained the Chinese mainland. The United States stationed troops in many of the allied countries—especially Japan and South Korea—and maintained military presence in the surrounding region. During these

⁴ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 25, PT2 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1951), 925.

⁵ Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990*, 41, 283.

years, the United States intervened in the war in Vietnam; in which China was also involved and the leaders in Washington requested the allies not to establish normal relations with China. The United States government prohibited American citizens from visiting China—even for personal reasons. It could be said that Washington broke off trade and conducted an international embargo of Communist China.⁶

While channels of communication have multiplied since then, mutual impressions have not improved to a corresponding degree. This inconstant perspective of each other matters because images and perceptions influence actions in both official and unofficial ways. The importance of this thesis is to identify the historical events that affected policy makers' formulation of the image of China during the early period of U.S-China relations. Also, the thesis provides a method for understanding the way images are formed, and how they can be recognized. It also illustrates the unique U.S.-China relationship, which continues to have implications today.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS

An image of another state is not the only factor that has influence over foreign policy. According to James Rosenau, there are five major factors that influence foreign policy decisions. The societal, external, and global environments, as well as governmental settings are the major contributors in influencing policy making. Also, the roles of policy makers and individual characteristics of decision-making leaders matter.⁷ While these factors are the ones that are popularly studied by scholars and decision makers, not many study the effects of images of another state. In that sense, this paper focuses on only the image factor in foreign policy. It examines the U.S. perception of China that affected the formation of America's China policy.

Also, factors that influence foreign policy change over time. Values, norms, and institutions evolve as the world changes. For example, there is a significant difference in human rights, before and after modernization. It can be said that factors that determine

⁶ Barnett A. Doak, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy* (New York: Harper, 1960), 122.

⁷ James Rosenau, "From Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in *Classics of International Relations*, 3rd ed., ed. John A. Vasquez (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), 243.

foreign policy have changed over time. For example, evidence of U.S-China relations can be found back to the Qing Dynasty. The images of China have indeed changed, as well as the factors that affect foreign policy. Even during the 1950s to the early 1970s, there were numerous incidents that could have caused America to hold a negative image of China. A single incident is unlikely be the solitary reason for a national perception.

Thus, this research limits the time under examination during the Truman administration. In the time frame, three events will be examined to explain the potential turning points of the shift in China's image—particularly in Acheson's cognition of China. The establishment of a communist state in mainland China, the formation of a Sino-Soviet alliance, and the Chinese intervention in the Korean War can be said to have influence in the matter. While each event will be emphasized as a driver where the U.S. policy makers could have recognized Communist China as a threat, the thesis examines the hypothesis that despite other incidents, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War was the main factor that formed a hostile image of China and dominated the U.S. China policy until the U.S.-China normalization.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, the existing literatures that develop the initial question and assumptions of the research are presented. It also states the problems identified from statements of various authors who argue the shift in the image of China occurred after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

1. The Individual's Perception in Policy Making

Despite various factors that determine foreign policy, there is no definite and single one that dominates the rest. As complex as it is, there could be multiple reasons why a state acts towards another state. Jervis argues that it is difficult to examine policy decisions in a situation without regarding the policy makers' cognition of the world and

the surrounding environment. The cognition of the world around them is part of the main cause of the relevant behavior.⁸ Other literatures suggest that perceptions and images are an important factor in a country's response.

Most of the studies on policy making are focused on how the government and the policy makers act. K. J. Holsti argues that before analyzing how they act, it is more important to analyze why the policy makers act a certain way. He talks about the role of political figures and the influence they have on diplomatic issues. So it could be thought that the role of a national image is based on the argument of the importance of analyzing the individual and the small group as the core of the decision making process. It is also based on the cognitive approach that the decision maker is influenced by the perception of the world he or she has.⁹ As stated in the beginning, Jervis argues that people tend to simplify the uncertain world to a point where it becomes manageable. In the process, a belief system or an image of a subject dwells in the individual mind for a long period, and after constituting the logical system of the mind, a cognitive consistency tends to constantly formulate the actions of the individual.¹⁰

Kulma posits that the perceptual approach assumes that state interaction is a function of how an issue is perceived by policy decision makers. It is a course that acknowledges the role of variables such as, motivation, personality, bureaucratic pressures, and other factors that influence the actions of states within the international political system. The perceptual system builds mental representations through the use of psychological mechanisms, one of which categorizes an object or situation based on elements or attributes that are shared with similar phenomena, objects, and people. The products of this psychological mechanism, or categorization, are mental representations in the form of images, which have been found to influence the decisions of those responsible for the formulation of foreign policy.¹¹

⁸ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 28–29.

⁹ K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*. 5th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), 318.

¹⁰ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 308.

¹¹ Kulma, “The Evolution of U.S. Images of China,” 76.

Historical incidents have massive influence on the perception of the future, and as an effect, can constitute or can be used on the analogy of another country's image.¹² Distinctive incidents, such as massive war, will form a new image of the opposing country, and the next administration will make policy choices with the new image as reference. This matches Jervis's argument that a cognitive consistency tends to formulate the actions of the individual, resulting in the future choices with the embedded perceptions.¹³

Although the cognitive consistency leading to actions of an individual is important, the effects of the individual factor on decision making can be regarded as the most controversial in the field of foreign policy analysis. The individual factor implies that personal characteristics, processes of cognition, and perceptions or beliefs of a 'human agency' play a crucial role in making of a foreign policy. The basis of this argument is that, in the end, the individual human makes the decisions that shape a policy, not organizations or states.¹⁴ Although the individual factor is important in understanding foreign policy, it should be noted that the 'human agency' is also significantly constrained by both the domestic and international political systems.

The individual factor in decision making has been denigrated for a long period of time. Irving Janis states that the individual plays the least significant part in politics.¹⁵ Even in the psychological field, many recognize that there are a number of situations where external factors tend to dominate the internal process in the course of decision making.¹⁶ Still, there are others who oppose these arguments such as Zeev Maoz and Anat Shayer, who state that the individual factor in foreign policy should not be neglected, and the evidence they use to support this argument is the significant events—

¹² Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20, no. 3 (1968): 470, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009777>.

¹³ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 308.

¹⁴ Lloyd Jensen, *Explaining Foreign Policy* (London: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 13.

¹⁵ Irving Lester Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1972), 3.

¹⁶ Margaret G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders," *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 1(1980): 49, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600126>.

such as the conflicts between the Israeli Prime Ministers and the Knesset leading to escalation—in which the actions of a ‘human agency’ play a key part in international relations.¹⁷ Nonetheless, given that the international and domestic environment allows the capacity for the individual influence, this study will maintain that the individual factor is essential.

When considering the individual factor in foreign policy making, it is important to identify the systematic conditions where the ‘human agency’ can make a crucial influence. Jenson identifies these situations, and analyzes the conditions where the individual significantly dominates the decision making process. He argues that the best condition for the human factor to have a decisive impact in the process is when the individual needs to display interest in foreign affairs, be in a position that has a high degree of decisional latitude, and be confronted by a non-routine situation that has ambiguous information.¹⁸ Non-routine situations and situations that have little or too much information are more likely to be affected by the individual factor. Therefore, disregarding the rational decisions made by observing external factors, supporters of the psychological models in policy making assume that decisions are not made by the calculative reasoning, but by the perceptions of an individual decision maker.

When disregarding the external factors that could have ultimate influence in the policy making process, it can be argued that knowing the perception of a policy maker can give foreign policy analysts discernible explanations for the reasons why certain policies were made, and if possible, provide guidance in predictions regarding decision making. Supporting this argument, Margaret Hermann has stated that predictions in foreign policy making can be made by analyzing the decision maker’s character,

¹⁷ Zeev Maoz and Anat Shayer, “The Cognitive Structure of Peace and War Argumentation: Israeli Prime Ministers versus the Knesset,” *Political Psychology* 8, no. 4 (1987): 576, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3790923>.

¹⁸ Jensen, *Explaining Foreign Policy*, 14–15.

personality, and idiosyncrasies. The prediction can be made because examining the personal behavior is equivalent to analyzing the predisposition of the individual decision maker.¹⁹

It is essential to recognize that cognition and personality of an individual are fundamentally connected, because predictions are made by analyzing the cognitive processes that are involved in decision making. This implies that the cognition structure of the individual relies on experience, role in the system, and the natural belief system. Jervis implies that cognition is essential in forming perception, and understanding the way in which a decision maker perceives him or herself, the enemy, and the world, which is crucial in analyzing policy decisions.²⁰

Because personal ideas, background, and perceptions of an individual affect the process of information, it can be said that it also affects the decisional outputs. The role of cognitive consistency—when individual decision makers assert that the outcomes of situations match their belief system—supports this idea. In extreme cases, this process may develop into cognitive dissonance. The individual decision maker could avoid or justify alternative information that opposes his or her perception of the world.

With the explanations of individual factors affecting foreign policy decision making, and the ways that can help in providing explanations and making predictions, it is important to know how to analyze the individual factor—the way to examine the perception of an individual about a certain subject. Hermann states that indirect measures are commonly used to assess the individual character or perception, such as a policy maker's statements, speeches, and responses to questions in press conferences.²¹ This thesis will pursue that line. It will choose an individual with significant influence in foreign policy making during the early Cold War years—when the Truman Administration in the United States was forming a new China policy—and choose a

¹⁹ Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders,” 43–44.

²⁰ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, 8–9.

²¹ Hermann, “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders,” 14.

method to analyze his or her perception of China which—as stated in the literature above—could have influenced the actions and decisions in the policy forming process. The individual factor during this period is particularly important, due to the events between the United States and the newly formed Communist China. Although U.S.-China relations will be mentioned in more detail in the later part of this thesis, it could be noted that the U.S. China policy did not recognizably shift until the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. External factors, such as the proclamation of the PRC, the Sino-Soviet treaty, and other provocations, as well as criticism of the State Department from Congress for not taking a strong stance against the Communist Chinese did not necessarily shape a firm China policy. This meant that despite conflict between states and pressure from domestic politicians, another factor—the individual factor—had more influence on shaping the China policy during the Truman Administration.

2. U.S. Perceptions and Images of China

The debate between U.S policy makers on whether to consider and treat China like the Soviet communist regime had been going on since the birth of the Chinese Communist Party. Cohen states that in the mid-1920s the United States observed the forming of a communist China, but did not consider engaging in anti-imperialism or agitation like the Soviets. The U.S view of Chinese communism was a not a Western form, and the policy makers had a strong perception that it would not succeed. The U.S administration, at that time, believed that the victory of the Nationalists was the utmost solution in defending China and the rest of the world against evil Soviet powers. The United States also thought that in the end, China would turn into a pro-American liberal, democratic state.²²

John Spanier, in his views on American foreign policy since World War II, states that a huge misconception took place in the process of forming an image of China. The United States evaluated the Chinese Communist Party without preliminary distrust, and encouraged by this optimism, thought that there was a possibility in an agreement

²² Warren I. Cohen, *America's Respond to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 138.

between the Nationalist and the Communist party during their civil war. With the cooperation between the two parties, the United States thought that it could propagate American values and beliefs of democratic liberalism onto the China mainland. Chinese communism was not viewed like the Soviet imperialism, and in the end, the U.S thought was that the KMT would eventually defeat the Communist Party. So, U.S. negotiations with the CCP were considered unnecessary.²³

When the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was signed in February 14, 1950, U.S.-China relations deteriorated. When the PRC seized the U.S. consulate in Beijing and as the diplomats went home, it was the end of the official contact between the United States and China. Schaller states that even after the rupture, Acheson told Congress, before the United States took any dramatic and new initiatives in China, it should “wait for the dust to settle.”²⁴ Acheson also implied that once the new communist regime began governing, and after the KMT in Taiwan collapsed, the PRC might act more moderately and renew diplomatic relations with the United States again.²⁵ Of course, in the end this did not occur until the 1970s.

Warren Cohen argues that “the Chinese intervention in Korea hardened American opposition to the Beijing regime and widened the circle of Americans who sought Chiang’s return to power” and that the “criticism of the administration’s earlier refusal to aid the KMT against the Communist mounted when the young American soldiers died at the hands of Mao’s armies.”²⁶ He states, “When the events of the Korean War convinced the most men of the monolithic nature of international communism, the earlier contentions that Chinese Communism had a strong nationalistic flavor, that Mao would not serve as Stalin’s puppet, and that, like it or not, the Chinese Communists would

²³ John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, 17th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 67–68.

²⁴ Dean Acheson quoted in Michael Schaller, *The United States and China: Into the 21st Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 119.

²⁵ Ibid., 119.

²⁶ Cohen, *America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 190.

ultimately triumph seemed naïve to many.”²⁷ The Chinese who were traditionally viewed with “contempt, pity, and compassion” by the American people had “become one of their most feared enemies.”²⁸

Jervis states that the Korean War initiated the start of a firm U.S. containment strategy of communism.²⁹ Beyond the evil image of communism that affected the foreign policy of the United States, the war in Korea with the Chinese intervention significantly altered U.S. policy, and led to an increase in the U.S-China hostility that followed. It convinced decision makers that China was fundamentally hostile to the United States. Others thought that China became hostile to a capitalist country after the proclamation of the PRC.

As stated before, Cohen argues that due to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the traditional view of contempt, sympathy, and compassion towards the Chinese people turned into one of the most hostile attitudes in history.³⁰ The alteration in the image of China led to policy changes as well. The U.S policy makers considered communism as a Soviet attempt to expand its influence in the region for world dominance. As a result, the policy for a communist China was containment. This judgment of the U.S. administration led to the perception that the communist states in Asia, such as China, Vietnam, and Russia had the same intentions in their national interest. Although the expectations and hope were for Chinese nationalism, Truman and his advisors concluded that China was an anti-American state whether Mao was independent of the Soviet influence or not. Consequently, the indiscriminate U.S view of the communist ideology interrupted the possibilities of diplomatic means in resolving issues with communist states.

The image of a Soviet puppet combined with the image of an anti-status quo power also increased the hostile appearance of the Chinese. In the historical sense, the

²⁷ Ibid., 190–191.

²⁸ Ibid., 191.

²⁹ Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 4 (1980), 583–584. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173775>.

³⁰ Cohen, *America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 4th ed., 174.

Chinese intervention in the Korean War could have been a lesson that China was ready to use military means to protect its national interests and security as a full sovereign state. But, the leaders in Washington saw the Chinese use of force from another point of view. U.S. policy makers became anxious about China's goal in integration of territory and its aggressive character. Also, Doak states that the Korean War, which involved many U.S. casualties, was the major factor that affected the American attitudes towards the Communist regime.³¹ Cohen states that after the Korean War, despite their hopes for Chinese nationalism, the Truman leadership was forced to conclude that whether Mao was independent or not, he was intensely anti-American. Mao's hostility was reciprocated when Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk officially declared the People's Republic of China a "Slavic Manchukuo," implying that it was a puppet state of the Soviet Union in 1951.³² The perception of a poor, weak, and divided nation changed into a single totalitarian state and the Chinese Communist Party as a force to spread the influence of communism over the borders.

While the literature shows that a certain image formed during a certain point in the tense relations between the United States and Communist China, most neglect objective evidence to support their arguments. The authors simply state that the image of China shifted due to the events that affected the U.S.-China relationship. Though in the general sense it could be logical that an individual's image of another state changed after a huge event, it lacks the visual data—such as content analysis results of the policy maker—to support the assumption. So, while it can be generally admitted that an aggressive image of China formed after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, this thesis will provide other forms of statistical data to strengthen the validity of the argument.

E. METHOD AND THESIS OVERVIEW

The problem in addressing images in international politics is that countries do not have images of other countries; individuals have images of other countries. The

³¹ Doak, *Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy*, 4.

³² Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 4th ed., 194.

individuals that matter in the case are the ones that make political decisions. But which have the most or the more crucial influence on America's view of China? The problem lies in choosing the individuals which must be done with the utmost objectivity in order to prevent false inference.

There are various individuals who shape foreign policy. While many play different roles, this thesis limits its research to one main individual who had prominent influence in shaping the U.S. China policy. Melvyn Leffler refers to Harry S. Truman, George C. Marshall, Dean G. Acheson, George Kennan, and Paul Nitze, as the ones who were the major players in forming America's Grand Strategy from 1945 to 1952.³³ Among these five important political figures, one specific individual, Dean Acheson will be selected for his influence in shaping foreign policy during the early years of the Truman administration. The importance of Acheson's role as Secretary of State and his relationship with the president will be addressed later in the thesis.

As the goal of this research is to test the hypothesis that Acheson adopted a hostile view of Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the thesis will need to explain why Acheson was selected to represent the U.S. foreign policy making circle—especially in regard to the China policy, and the method to identify an image of an individual. The following chapter will present Acheson's role as the Secretary of State to illustrate the general influence he had on foreign policy making. As the study is about the image of China held by the U.S. leadership, Acheson's influence on determining the U.S. China policy will be presented to emphasize that he is the appropriate individual the study should focus on. Also, in the chapter, the method to identify Acheson's view of China will be addressed. As content analysis is used in many studies to identify and measure belief systems and images of certain subjects, the research will also pursue the method. It will first identify the advantages and the limitations of the method, and find a way to reinforce its validity when used. In an attempt to provide more objective data—one of the limits identified in the use of content analysis—the research

³³ Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945–1952," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 80–84.

will introduce the use of a computer-aided content analysis program named DICTION 7.0. The analysis of statements will be provided in numeric forms, which allows the researcher to have a statistical view in evaluating the China image of Acheson.

With the content analysis method, statements of Acheson are analyzed in Chapter III. It provides a description of the statements being used to verify that the data is not biased in favor of the researcher. A timeline of U.S.-China relations follows to identify possible turning points which could have caused Acheson's China image to shift. After identifying three potential points in the relations, analysis results of the statements regarding Communist China are presented. Also, a manual analysis is conducted to provide possible explanations of the DICTION 7.0 results. Implementing the possible turning points, the analysis of the statements is divided into four categories—before the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, after the proclamation of the PRC until the Sino-Soviet Treaty, after the Sino-Soviet Treaty until the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The chapter focuses on the effort to identify certain images of Communist China—hostile or weak—from the statements made during the periods above.

In Chapter IV, U.S.-China relations are assessed to state that the possibilities of Acheson developing a hostile image of Communist China was constantly increasing while the DICTION results—in numerical scores of “Aggression” and “Optimism” detected in the statements—state that the shift in image occurred after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Main terms that describe Communist China in Acheson's statements will be presented as supporting evidence. In the concluding chapter, the implication of the research and its use in future situations where images of states influence policy making, are presented.

From analyzing the results—scores of the aggressive and optimistic tone in the statements regarding Communist China—the research showed that an aggressive tone significantly increased after the Chinese intervention, indicating a change in Acheson's China image. Although the optimistic tone in Acheson's statements regarding Communist China did not significantly change, which suggests less support for the hypothesis, manual analysis of the statements is presented to explain the results; Acheson

did not have an optimistic view of Communist China from the beginning, so there was little change even after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. With the supporting results and explanations, this thesis argues that Acheson did develop a hostile image of Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

II. THE SUBJECT AND THE METHOD

This chapter presents the individual on which the research focuses. The study will use a specific individual to analyze the effects of personal perception influencing policy decision making by evaluating the influence of the Secretary of State, specifically Dean Acheson during the Truman administration.

A. THE INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Before evaluating Acheson for his individual beliefs, research must be done on the institution, and his position in the institution, to determine how much influence it had in the decision making process. Leffler states that with the death of President Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman was left with the greatest military and economic power in the world. But the new leadership was concerned with finding a new way of keeping the American dominance in the world. Truman's task was to forge a new world order based on nonaggression, self-determination, equal access to raw materials, nondiscriminatory trade, and liberal participation in international organizations. But in the first period of 1945, the leadership had no idea of how to translate the task into policy. So, Truman decided to form a new Policy Planning Staff that would shape U.S. foreign policy in the future. The State Department in the Truman administration was in charge of setting priorities to forge a new strategy: Containment of communism's influence and the continuance of U.S. influence in the international community. It can be assumed that as the State Department was given a huge task, the leadership—in spite of the opposition in other political sectors—approved of the activities and the products of the Department. So, it can be said that the State Department had sufficient legitimacy during the Truman administration. This also implies that the head of the State Department, Dean Acheson, had substantial influence in the process of foreign policy making.³⁴ Next, the study assesses the level of influence the Secretary of State has in the department and in the government.

The Secretary of State heads the U.S. Department of State. The Secretary is primarily concerned with foreign affairs. He or she is also a member of the President's

³⁴ Leffler, "The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945–1952," 83.

Cabinet and the National Security Council. In the succession in the presidential line, the Secretary is the highest appointed executive branch official. According to the Department of State, the duties of the Secretary of State include the following: The Secretary “organizes and supervises the entire United States Department of State and the United States Foreign Service.” He or she “advises the President on matters relating to U.S. foreign policy, including the appointment of diplomatic representatives to other nations, and on the acceptance or dismissal of representatives from other nations.” Also, the Secretary “participates in high-level negotiations with other countries, either bilaterally or as part of an international conference or organization, or appoints representatives to do so. This includes the negotiation of international treaties and other agreements.” And, he or she is “responsible for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas.”³⁵ Overall, it can be said that the Secretary of State—who is responsible for the management of the diplomatic service of the United States—can have significant influence in the foreign policy making process.

David S. McLellan, in his book about Acheson, states

in an America in which power was quite capable of corroding the integrity of the strongest man, Acheson stood out because he spoke and acted upon what his thought and conscience dictated ... Until the end he said what he believed, no matter who was hurt, including himself.

This assessment implies that Acheson had a strong position in the Department and that his decisions in the policy making process were not ignored. So it can be concluded that Acheson was in a situation where the State Department was at the center of forming a U.S. grand strategy, and as the head of the Department, he had the power—as well as the responsibility—to influence the decisions being made.

B. ACHESON’S INFLUENCE ON THE U.S. CHINA POLICY

Though the Secretary of State and the State Department itself are recognized as having the duties and the responsibilities listed previously, it is difficult to assume that

³⁵ U.S. Department of State, “Duties of the Secretary of State of the United States,” last modified January 20, 2009, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/115194.htm>.

the policy decisions are entirely determined by him or her. It is the Secretary's task to provide the President of the United States with advice to make the major policy decisions. So, as an advisor on foreign policy, it is important to have a close relationship with the chief executive in order to make sure that the recommendations are properly implemented in policy making. If there is distrust and disagreement in the relationship of the president and the Secretary of State, it can be easily assumed that the Secretary's influence in the policy-making process or in the administration can be disregarded.

James Chace has asserted that Acheson's presence, as the head of the State Department, was dominant in the Truman administration. Truman rarely questioned advice from the Secretary of State, and no other department in the administration had the influence that could be compared with Acheson in shaping foreign policy.

No secretary of state in this century possessed the power Truman granted to Acheson. ... In the end, his actions not only defined American power and purpose in the postwar era, but also laid the foundations for American predominance at the end of the twentieth century and beyond.³⁶

Acheson's influence, particularly on U.S. China policy during the Truman Administration, can be noticed in comments from the following literature. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker states that Acheson was the center of forming America's China policy. The white paper—which was the main framework for the future China policy—was based on Acheson's developing thoughts on the future of U.S.-China relations.³⁷ Moreover, she states that Acheson, while inviting other perspectives on the China issue, did not necessarily use the opinions of others. This meant that as Secretary of State, Acheson was confident in his decisions in the process of forming a China policy.³⁸

Acheson's influence in the foreign policy-making circle is also emphasized. During the tenures of James Byrnes and George Marshall, Acheson had served as Acting Secretary of State, and with his intimate relationship with President Truman, he had the

³⁶ James Chace, *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 441.

³⁷ Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 3.

³⁸ Ibid.

most influence in shaping foreign policy,³⁹ which made him “virtually the president’s only advisor on international relations.”⁴⁰ This left Acheson in control of the China policy—with the lack of general interest and the confusing situation of the civil war between the Nationalist and the Communist groups, Congress “left the White House and the State Department in almost complete control of Chinese affairs”⁴¹ Tucker also states that Truman trusted Acheson’s decisions and rarely intervened, particularly in the China policy, and gave the State Department a considerable amount of freedom in U.S. foreign policy.⁴² This meant that Acheson, with his unmatchable influence within the presidential advisor circle, was the key factor in forming the China policy.

An example of Acheson’s influence regarding the China policy can be identified during the events of the detention of Consul General Ward in Mukden. With the maltreatment of a U.S. citizen by the Communist Chinese officials, Tucker states that Truman probably would have decided to block the Chinese coast as he had threatened before. Also, he would have vetoed Ambassador Stuart’s visit to Beijing to meet with the Communist leaders if not for the State Department.⁴³ Regarding this situation Ronald L. McGlothlen illustrates the event in more detail. He states that after knowing Truman’s anger with Communist China, Acheson and his advisors hurried over to the White House and convinced the president that the situation in China would be resolved, and that the main goal of the United States was to divide the developing relationship between the PRC and the Soviet Union. Truman recalled his idea of a blockade and followed Acheson’s advice.⁴⁴

Though the domestic political circles frequently attacked the administration’s mild attitude toward the Communist Chinese regime, Truman trusted Acheson and his

³⁹ Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–1950*, 6.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 7.

⁴¹ Ibid., 13.

⁴² Ibid., 174.

⁴³ Ibid., 174.

⁴⁴ Ronald L. McGlothlen, *Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia* (New York: Norton, 1993), 150.

policy towards China in general. McGlothlen emphasizes that Truman referred to Acheson as his “number one brain man”⁴⁵ and focuses on his special relationship with the president and the influence he had on his subordinates. Acheson had the respect of Dean Rusk, Lucius Battle, and Max Bishop—his closest advisors—who recall that the Secretary was a man who received genuine support of his decisions from the Department.⁴⁶ Acheson’s decisions on the China policy had substantial influence within the political chain, from top to bottom.

So, as the head of a distinguished department in a time when its role was emphasized for the formation of a U.S. grand strategy, including a U.S. China policy, and with the close relationship with the president, both personally and officially, Dean Acheson is a valid individual for examination in the research. This thesis will be based on the assumption that Acheson’s influence in the process of forming a U.S. China policy during the Truman administration was greater than any other decision maker within the political circle, and try to assess the what image he had of China, which could have affected his decisions.

C. CONTENT ANALYSIS

The definition of content analysis, according to Ole R. Holsti, is “a technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages.”⁴⁷ It is a technique or method of analysis which has been widely used in many sectors⁴⁸ and is usually used for the generation of data in the testing of one’s hypotheses.

The validity of the content analysis method is emphasized in an attempt to search for other scientific methods in psychological research—methods being usually borrowed from positivistic science. Robert Faux, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh, states

⁴⁵ Ibid., 19.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 20.

⁴⁷ Ole R. Holsti. *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 14.

⁴⁸ Robert E. Mitchell, “The Use of Content Analysis for Explanatory Studies,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (1967), 231–233, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2747200>.

that psychology has been using positivistic science methods in its studies. More recently, however, psychologists who use qualitative research methodologies are increasing. In studies of cognitive psychology, the method of content analysis is being used to research cases of verbal and literal responses to problem solving tasks. Faux conducted a case study to describe the uses of content analysis and interviews with participants in educational psychology research. The purpose of the research was to examine the application of existing knowledge of undergraduate students in case study problems and to analyze what the students' emotional responses were about the use of case studies as an instructional tool. As a research method, content analysis of the students' written responses to cases and individual interviews were conducted. In the conclusion, Faux stated that in research that examines the subjects' analysis of case studies and their emotions, content analysis and interviews were the best method.⁴⁹

Other than the psychological sector, various forms of content analysis have been used in political research. It is widely used in the study of international politics, including foreign policy.⁵⁰ Although it has been frequently used, content analysis in political research, like any other method, has not been able to avoid criticism. The general weakness of content analysis is that it is partly limited in the depth of its study. As the study of content analysis is based primarily on the communication means of people, it cannot accurately conclude on the inner thoughts of the presenter. Another weakness is that it can be questioned for its objectivity. As with any research, the data that is needed for the assessment is collected by a human researcher. The researcher is required to have a general position in the process of collecting data. The data can be interpreted in another way to other researchers, as it is the choice of an individual.

However, those who support content analysis feel that the advantages of the method outweigh its deficiencies. A general point that scholars make for the use of

⁴⁹ Robert Faux, "A Description of the Uses of Content Analyses and Interviews in Educational/Psychological Research," *Qualitative Social Research* 1, no. 1 (2000): 26, <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1136/2533>.

⁵⁰ Jerry D. Gilbert, "John Foster Dulles' Perceptions of the People's Republic of China: A Study of Belief Systems and Perception in the Analysis of Foreign Policy-Making" (Ph.D. diss., Texas Tech University, 1973), 88.

content analysis is based upon the fact that most of the research in politics must be observed from the outside and be initiated after the event has taken place. Since there are few occasions and it is less likely for a researcher to observe directly the development of events, the analysis of certain individuals tends to be subjected to content analysis. The method provides the researcher a more logical and objective way to assess the facts about events, the environment, and the images and perceptions of individuals to use in the study.⁵¹

The content analysis method shows another advantage in analyzing past statements of individuals. Researchers who prefer the content analysis method argue that it is relatively more objective than the data that is acquired with a subject or individual who is aware that the information he or she presents has the potential of being used in a research. It is also generally felt by many that written statements have more restraint on the speaker and is more candid than other types of data. Any type of communication that is written tends to be formal and more sincere than spoken ones. Also it applies more pressure to the writer than spoken data; because of that, the writer is expected to be more responsible for what he or she has stated. This observation is supported by many journalists and reporters who often request that individuals write an official statement of their oral comments.⁵²

With these points in mind, it can be said that content analysis is a valid methodology and is qualified to complement the traditionally used methods in analyzing images and perceptions of individuals. Despite the controversy, researchers who use the content analysis method argue that when using the same data, the method advances other traditional methods which do not provide a more objective quality in the analysis of the data or the system.

David G. Winter and Abigail J. Stewart illustrate the uses of the content analysis method to assess personal characteristics and belief systems—including perceptions of a specific subject. They note that the method is systematic and objective in studying both

⁵¹ Gilbert, “John Foster Dulles’ Perceptions of the People’s Republic of China: A Study of Belief Systems and Perception in the Analysis of Foreign Policy-Making,” 90.

⁵² Ibid.

written and transcribed oral material.⁵³ While laying out the advantages of the method in analyzing an individual, the study presents a noticeable example in the use of content analysis. It uses the method to analyze President Nixon's behavior and motives using his speeches before and after the Watergate scandal. Before the scandal, the authors assess that Nixon had more power in his tone than after the incident. They conclude that the content analysis method is relevant and useful in testing hypotheses of political leaders and how they think and act.

Hermann also uses the content analysis to measure personal characteristics and beliefs. In one study, she examines the statements of Congressmen during a floor debate in the U.S. House of Representatives, in an attempt to find two specific beliefs—humanitarian ideology and orientation toward international involvement—of the political leaders.⁵⁴ Using the content analysis method, Hermann tries to identify important characteristics—one of which is optimism. The optimism factor that Hermann refers to is “a general expectation of good and favorable outcome in the future and a general satisfaction with the present.”⁵⁵ It also means that “the optimistic individual makes positive references to how things are at present and has positive expectations for the future.”⁵⁶ This indicates that the emotional state or an attitude of an individual in regard to a specific subject will be expressed in his or her statements.

In analyzing leadership personality and foreign policy behavior, Hermann again emphasizes the use of the content analysis method. She illustrates the difficulties of assessing personal characteristics and images of a subject. Because the usual way to evaluate an individual is by personality tests and interviews, and since access to heads of state for these purposes is extremely difficult, another means of assessing personal views is required. Content analysis—though indirect—provides a way to examine political

⁵³ David G. Winter and Abigail J. Stewart, “Content Analysis as a Technique for Assessing Political Leaders,” in *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*, ed. Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas W Milburn (New York: Free Press, 1977), 27.

⁵⁴ Hermann, “Some Personal Characteristics Related to Foreign Aid Voting of Congressmen,” in *A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders*, ed. Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas W Milburn (New York: Free Press, 1977), 312–313.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 316.

⁵⁶ Hermann, “Some Personal Characteristics Related to Foreign Aid Voting of Congressmen,” 316.

leaders without their awareness that they are under examination, which promotes the objectivity of the data collected. Also, it provides a method to measure personal beliefs and views of deceased political individuals, since they are no longer subject to live interviews.⁵⁷

Another interesting example of the use of content analysis is William Eckhardt and Ralph White's test of Uriel Bronfenbrenner's mirror-image theory of the Cold War. In an attempt to prove the hypothesis that there existed a "mirror image" in the mutual perceptions of the United States and Russia, and that the image represented distortion by the other side, the authors use Kennedy and Khrushchev's speeches to examine the image one had against the other state. By using a content analysis method, the content of the speeches was categorized into 31 values—including "aggression"—of the speaker. It then emphasized the most frequent value that was identified in Kennedy and Khrushchev's statements regarding each state.⁵⁸ In the conclusion, Eckhardt and White state that they found that by analyzing public speeches made by the two leaders, the "mirror-image" theory was partially confirmed. This indicates also indicates that the content analysis method is valid to assess a political leader's personally held image of another state.

This thesis will focus mainly on the use of the content analysis method in Myron Greenberg's dissertation on the position of Secretary of State and individuals who have held that position—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Dean Rusk—and their belief systems. In an attempt to measure various elements of the former Secretaries' belief systems, Greenberg uses content analysis to identify what the individuals thought about a subject. In the category of the Secretaries' view of the adversary, the author emphasizes the question of what the image of the enemy is. He states that it is important because of the "structural interrelationship existing within the belief system between the actor's perception of the nature of politics and his image of the enemy."⁵⁹ With the content

⁵⁷ Hermann, "Leadership Personality and Foreign Policy Behavior," in *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods*, ed. James N. Rosenau (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), 209.

⁵⁸ William Eckhardt and Ralph K. White, "A Test of the Mirror-Image Hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11, no. 3 (1967): 325–327, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/172598>

⁵⁹ Myron Arthur Greenberg, *The Secretary of State and Secretarial Belief Systems: An Inquiry into the Relationship between Knowledge and Action* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1981), 35.

analysis method, the image of the enemy is described by analyzing public speeches of the Secretaries, and the evolution of those images over time is also identified.⁶⁰ Greenberg also includes external factors—such as international incidents that could have affected the decision-making process—as variables in his study. He provides graphs such as infiltration rates of the North Vietnamese Army and the American response to show that despite provocations from the enemy, there was a point where the U.S. response rate was lower than the threats.⁶¹ This indicates that the image of the enemy that was held by the decision maker had shifted at a point due to a certain event.

A similar use of the content analysis method can be noticed in Jerry Gilbert's dissertation, "John Foster Dulles' Perceptions of the People's Republic of China: A Study of Belief Systems and Perception in the Analysis of Foreign Policy-Making."⁶² Although the external variables that could have affected Dulles's perception of the PRC are not included, the study presents statistical data of the expressions that are used to describe Communist China. He presents analyzed data—which are in numerical form—to identify the top terms of expressions that indicate the a particular image that Dulles had of China during his term as Secretary of State. Also, it can be noticed that there were radical changes in the pattern of the numerical results, which later Gilbert explained by applying certain events that could have influenced the China image.⁶³

This thesis is based on the assumption that a particular individual, Dean Acheson had the most influence in shaping the U.S. China policy during the early Cold War period. Knowing the personal characteristics—especially Acheson's view of Communist China—helps researchers to understand and analyze why a certain policy was made. As illustrated above, content analysis is an appropriate method to know an individual's personally held image or perception of a subject, particularly when the individual is deceased. With the advantages of content analysis and its use in pre-existing studies, this

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Greenberg, *The Secretary of State and Secretarial Belief Systems: An Inquiry Into the Relationship between Knowledge and Action*, 275.

⁶² Gilbert, "John Foster Dulles' Perceptions of the People's Republic of China: A Study of Belief Systems and Perception in the Analysis of Foreign Policy-Making," 88.

⁶³ Ibid., 145.

thesis will use the method—similar to Greenberg and Gilbert’s analyses—to test the hypothesis that Acheson’s image of Communist China changed after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

D. USING DICTION AS A TOOL FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

In the previous section, the research discussed the validity of the content analysis method to identify certain images of political leaders. Examples of content analysis used in analyzing certain images of the enemy can be found in Greenberg’s⁶⁴ and Gilbert’s⁶⁵ research. While both of the authors show general and logical data, both tend to lack in presenting more solid and objective evidence to support their arguments. In analyzing the enemy images held by Acheson, Dulles, and Rusk, Greenberg presents a rather quantitative method—such as counting pre-categorized terms that indicated the “enemy.” Though he supports the results with historical events that may have affected the choice in words used to describe a certain subject, one cannot but question the accuracy of the collected data. Questions arise whether the author actually did count the words without human error. The same question applies to Gilbert’s research, which applied a rather complex Evaluative Assertion Analysis method. At the time the dissertation was written, a computer program to aid in the analysis of this method was in development, but Gilbert sought to choose the manual way. As the equations and the length of the contents were long, and that required a great deal of time, there can be questions about the reliability of the data. These doubts about the accuracy and the reliability of the data lead to the use of computer-assisted text analysis programs in this thesis.

As sources of texts—especially electronic texts—are becoming more available and easy to access, computer-assisted text analysis has become an important method for discovering meaning. Computer-assisted text and content analysis has been constantly evolving and modified to be used for a broad spectrum of purposes—from educational research to multimedia applications. Efforts to improve the validity and effectiveness in

⁶⁴ Greenberg, *The Secretary of State and Secretarial Belief Systems: An Inquiry Into the Relationship between Knowledge and Action*, 275.

⁶⁵ Gilbert, “John Foster Dulles’ Perceptions of the People’s Republic of China: A Study of Belief Systems and Perception in the Analysis of Foreign Policy-Making,” 88.

the application of content analysis are continuously being made—testing old and existing, as well as other techniques to discover flaws and factors to improve. Moreover, with the continuing advancement in technology, the established methods of the computer-assisted content analysis are being upgraded and tested every day.

In an article about the application of computer-assisted text analysis, Melina Alexa states:

The existing model of assigning properties (categories), which are heuristic rather than conceptually based, to word forms and counting frequencies of occurrence of these properties is alone not sufficient for the variety of research questions and application contexts of text analysis. Furthermore, it has been often demonstrated that content cannot be analyzed without taking into account the general context of situation a text belongs to.⁶⁶

It is obvious that even the computer-assisted content analysis has limited abilities. Although, quantitative methods—such as counting frequent use of particular terms—have proven to be useful, a qualitative method in content analysis can be said to be more valid. Also, manual analysis of the situation in which the content is derived has to be considered—such as seen in Greenberg's research. This thesis will use a computer-aided text analysis program, DICTION 7.0, which uses a qualitative as well as quantitative method to evaluate the statements of Dean Acheson. The developers of the DICTION software describe the program thusly:

DICTION is a computer-aided text analysis program that uses a series of dictionaries to search a passage for five semantic features—Activity, Optimism, Certainty, Realism and Commonality—as well as thirty-five sub-features. DICTION uses predefined dictionaries and can use up to thirty custom dictionaries built with words that the user has defined, such as topical or negative words, for particular research needs.⁶⁷

The results from analyzing the data are provided in a numeric form for statistical analysis. The results can be seen in a form of raw totals, standardized scores, word and

⁶⁶ Melina Alexa, "Computer-assisted Text Analysis Methodology in the Social Sciences," ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht (1997), 5,
http://www.gesis.org/fileadmin/upload/forschung/publikationen/gesis_reihen/zuma_arbeitsberichte/97_07.pdf.

⁶⁷ "DICTION Overview," <http://www.dictionsoftware.com/diction-overview>.

character counts and percentages. With this process, researchers can use the program to analyze content in various ways. Also, the results of the program are based on the built-in database that has pre-analyzed 50,000 texts. Researchers can apply the data in a pre-fixed framework that is provided, which includes general speeches, political speeches, political debates, newspaper editorials, business reports, scientific documents, television scripts, and telephone conversations to get a comparative view of results of the research.⁶⁸

DICTION has been used in many books, dissertations, and other research in various fields. In the social science sector, Hart has used the program to analyze the statements and official announcements of presidents and other political leaders.⁶⁹ Davis and Gardner, in their research of leaders' use of charismatic rhetoric, provide a good description and valid reason for the use of the program. They start by promoting the use of the computerized content analysis method by stating the methodological benefits. First, with a mixed method of both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the method provides reliable results. Second, the coding method is standardized with the systematic and reliable computer program. Also, because it is a digital program, it has little chance of neglecting details that a human researcher might. They used the DICTION program for two reasons. DICTION was specifically designed to analyze the rhetoric of political leaders—President George W. Bush, in their case—and because it provided an advanced level of comparison and continuity between current events and relevant studies. Also, DICTION has several special features, including various dictionaries designed to analyze a text, and using statistical weighting in treating homographs as an effort to partially account for the context of the words, and allowing the researcher to create a custom dictionary for specific purposes in the study.⁷⁰ There are many other studies that have used DICTION as a tool in content analysis which have a respected reputation.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ R. P. Hart and J. P. Childers, "Verbal Certainty in American Politics: An Overview and Extension," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (2004): 516–534.

⁷⁰ K. M. Davis and W. L. Gardner, "Charisma under Crisis Revisited: Presidential Leadership, Perceived Leader Effectiveness, and Contextual Influences," *The Leadership Quarterly* 23, no. 5 (2012): 921–922, <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1048984312000483#>.

⁷¹ R. P. Hart, *Verbal Style and the Presidency: A Computer-Based Analysis* (New York: Academic Press, 1984).

Although DICTION cannot directly tell the researcher what an individual thinks on a specific subject, it provides numerical results of certain features such as optimism, positivity, present concern, past concern, and aggression that are identified from the content being analyzed. It gives analysts data to compare statements of various political leaders about a certain subject—for example, comparing the “Aggression” scores from statements of individuals A, B, and C, regarding incident D. More importantly, it provides data to compare statements regarding a certain subject—for example, comparing the “Optimism” scores of statements A, B, and C, regarding the subject D. The comparisons allow the researcher to find patterns in the various statements about certain events.

As the goal of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that Acheson’s image of PRC changed after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, DICITON 7.0 will be used to analyze the tenor of various statements of the Secretary regarding Communist China. The results will be examined in an attempt to identify distinctive patterns and changes in Acheson’s statements throughout a certain period. By applying Hermann’s description of the optimism factor in a statement—“a general expectation of good and favorable outcome in the future and a general satisfaction with the present”⁷²—the thesis will use the “Optimism” results of DICTION to evaluate Acheson’s attitude towards Communist China. Also, applying one of Eckhardt and White’s values—the aggressiveness in a statement—the “Aggression” results will be used. The relationship between a subject of hostility and a tone of aggression in a statement regarding the subject, as well as the relationship with the tone of optimism, will be discussed in the DICTION result section.

This thesis assumes that the “Optimism” score will decrease and the “Aggression” score will increase as Acheson perceived Communist China as a hostile enemy—which will be expressed in his statements. The scores are examined in an attempt to find certain points of radical changes in pattern. The points are then compared with a timeframe of U.S.-China relations to identify which event could have caused the shift in Acheson’s rhetoric—his personally held image of Communist China. Overall, the scores act as a tool

⁷² Hermann, “Some Personal Characteristics Related to Foreign Aid Voting of Congressmen,” 316.

of measurement in the process. By using a computer-assisted text analysis program, the thesis obtains more objective data—with less human error—to analyze, which in turn reinforces the validity of the argument.

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III. ANALYSIS OF ACHESON'S STATEMENTS

In this chapter, the study tests the hypothesis that the leadership—represented by Dean Acheson—adopted a hostile image of Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Statements regarding the Chinese Communist Party will be analyzed with a content analysis tool—DICITON 7.0—and a detailed explanation for the results are presented. A timeline of U.S.-China relations is illustrated to explain that despite indicators of tension between the United States and the PRC, the policy makers did little to prevent confrontation because of the pre-existing images—which later changed after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War—that interfered with the decision-making process.

First, the chapter describes the collected data. The intent of this description is to inform and argue that the data collected is not biased in favor of the researcher. Using the DICTION program and manually analyzing the statements of Acheson, selective data—in which Communist China may be mentioned in certain terms the researcher prefers—will compromise the results. As mentioned earlier, this is one of the problems identified in the use of the content analysis method. The chapter also presents that the data is generally collected from a source with authority and reliability, and indicates that the data is not affected by an individual with a biased opinion.

Next, it is essential to point out the events that could have affected Acheson's image of China. Since the cognition of a subject consistently evolves and changes by being influenced by external events, Acheson's perception of the PRC could have been altered by the events that were related to China. Interactions that could be generally identified as negative in the relations between the two countries are presented as points of the change in Acheson's perception of China.

After identifying the main points in history between the two countries, results of DICTION 7.0 analysis of the statements made by Acheson is presented. It focuses on the aggression and optimism factors of the results that indicate the attitude of the statement—Acheson, being the presenter of the statement—had on a particular subject—Communist

China. The aggression element represents the tone of voice when Acheson referred to the “Communist China” or “Chinese Communist,” as well as the sentence itself. The program analyzes the words that are used to describe, modify, and define Communist China, and provides the results in numerical form. The optimism element of the program provides the results according to the same process.

Numeric results in analyzing a statement is difficult to evaluate—there is no standard to compare the data with, when analyzing one individual. This is the reason why many studies analyze and compare the statements of multiple leaders regarding a similar subject.⁷³ For example, they provide analysis such as “the aggressiveness of a certain subject of leader A is higher than that of leader B.” Although this is an effective way to assess an individual’s image of a subject, this thesis compares the results throughout a set period. It focuses on the changes in patterns in the results of the analysis.

Then the thesis takes into account the events that could have had negative effects on the perception of China, and analyzes the statements regarding the events or China itself. The main point of this process is to reinforce the mechanical characteristics of the automated analysis of the statements. The program being used in the research—DICTION 7.0—can only analyze the statements themselves. It does not have the ability to consider external factors that could affect the subject. For example, let’s imagine that an individual A always called an individual B by the term C—with C being a positive term. After an agreement, with no change in the relationship between the two, A called B a D—imagining that D is a negative term—for a period. The automated program processes this information without consideration of the agreement, and presents a result that could conclude that A has negative feelings towards B. Since the content analysis method—DICTION 7.0 results in this case—helps identify changes in tone and language but cannot explain the reasons why those changes occurred, this thesis provides the analysis—an explanation—tied to the events.⁷⁴ So, in order to minimize the weakness of

⁷³ David Winter et al., “The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev Measured at a Distance: Procedures, Portraits, and Policy,” *Political Psychology* 12, no. 3 (1991), 457–464, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791463>.

⁷⁴ Greenberg, *The Secretary of State and Secretarial Belief Systems: An Inquiry Into the Relationship between Knowledge and Action*, 275.

the automated system, the researcher must identify changes in terms or a specific tone that concern China, while assessing the external factors that could have had effect on the individual.

After identifying the numeric changes in the results, along with the explanations of the results from the manual analysis of the statements, these results are compared with the three possible turning points identified in the events of U.S.-China relations. If the hypothesis is correct, the DICTION results in the “Aggression” factor will significantly increase, while the “Optimism” factor decreases after the point of the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Also, to support the numeric results, the manual analysis provides significant changes in terms that describe the Chinese Communists. Other results, such as a constant increase in the “Aggression” factor and decrease in the “Optimism” factor indicate that Acheson developed a hostile image of Communist China, along with the rising tensions in the U.S-China relations, proving the hypothesis wrong.

A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

For a rigorous evaluation, the content analysis should analyze all publicly available statements and documents in which Dean Acheson referred to China. Such a collection of statements should address numerous possible objections to use of the content analysis method. The use of all public statements results in the cancelling out of intentionally misleading statements. It is also felt that highly placed and publicly exposed figures such as Acheson tend to be trapped by their public statements. Even though a public statement may not reflect the true attitude or perception of the speaker, his/her actions will be influenced by the statements made.

The use of public statements rather than private ones may raise questions of the originality of the content. For example, statements of Acheson in a press conference would more likely represent his own attitude regarding China than formal speeches that are written in advance—with consideration and predictions about the reactions of the listeners. Regarding this problem, an interesting research by Jonathan Renshon of Harvard University supports the use of public statements in content analysis. Renshon states that content analysis has relied more on the analysis of public speeches than private

ones. This indicates that the use of the method is continuously being challenged by those who argue that the speeches being analyzed “represent attempts at deception, persuasion, or impression management.”⁷⁵ Renshon refutes these charges by comparing analysis of President John F. Kennedy’s public and private statements in the summer of 1962, of which the results are similar to those found later in this research. The study answers the main question, “Do leaders’ public speeches convey their actual beliefs?”⁷⁶ By using analysis programs—Profiler Plus v. 5.7.0 and Verbs In Context System (VICS)—the study presents analysis results of six public speeches of Kennedy regarding foreign policy issues and transcripts of privately recorded meetings the president had with his advisors on the same issues.⁷⁷ As the results showed that there was no specific distinction in the comparison, it indicated that using either public or private statements of political leaders does not affect the outcome of the analysis—emphasizing the validity of the use of public statements.⁷⁸

Another advantage of using public statements of Acheson for the research is that they represent the collective beliefs of the foreign policy-making leadership. Although this thesis is testing the hypothesis of Acheson’s shift in his view of Communist China, it would be a more valuable research to test the general idea of the State Department itself—including the White House. Also, as Acheson’s influence on the China policy was emphasized previously, this study assumes that while the statements were censored by various factors, the factors themselves were influenced by the Secretary’s ideas—which meant that the statements are valid as his own.

This data collection procedure requires finding all assertions made by Acheson regarding the People’s Republic of China. As the research presented in this thesis is limited in scale, and destined to exclude some of the statements, this research centers its collected data on one specific source. The primary source used to collect the statements

⁷⁵ Jonathan Renshon, “When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational Codes at a Distance,” *Political Psychology* 30, no. 4 (2009): 649, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25655421>.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 650.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 655.

⁷⁸ Winter et al., “The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev Measured at a Distance: Procedures, Portraits, and Policy,” 457–464.

made by Acheson is *The Department of State Bulletin*. Its goal is to provide the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations—especially on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department of State, and statements and addresses made by the president and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the department. It publishes articles on international affairs and the functions of the Department of State.⁷⁹ The *Bulletin* qualifies as a representative sample in such statements.

B. TIMELINE OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

Because the goal of this thesis is to identify the turning point in the U.S. view of China during the early Cold War period, it is important to understand the basic parameters of the relevant history. As stated earlier and used in Greenberg's dissertation in assessing the enemy images of the former Secretaries of State, it is imperative know the conditions of which the statements are being made. While multiple events can have absolutely no effect on an individual's perception of a certain subject, a single incident can dramatically change the entire belief system. Therefore, prior to the analysis of Acheson's statements, it is important to know the possible events that could have affected his personally held image of China. The following discussion identifies certain points in early U.S.-China relations that could have caused a hostile image of Communist China.

Robert Blum provides a good summary of the U.S.-China relations during the Truman administration. He emphasizes three important points in the relationship in which the tensions start to escalate—the proclamation of the People's Republic of China; the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Security; and the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

In the statement Mao made on June 30, 1949—"On the People's Democratic Dictatorship"—he defined a policy of leaning to one side, implying the Soviets. "Not only in China but throughout the world," he said, "one must lean either to imperialism or to socialism. There is no exception. Neutrality is merely a camouflage; a third road does

⁷⁹ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Foreword.

not exist.”⁸⁰ After the speech the United States Department of State released a famous document called the “White Paper” arguing that the fall of the Chinese Nationalists was caused by the incapability of the Nationalist regime itself. This document was an attempt to explain and to answer to questions and criticisms of other political leaders in the administration. While the U.S.’s China policy was continuously being debated in Washington, on October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed.⁸¹

Note that before the release of the “White Paper,” there was pre-existing tension between the United States and Communist China. The event when the Chinese Communist officials accused and charged U.S. Consul General Angus Ward of espionage—which resulted in the expulsion of the General and his staff—contributed to the potential of conflict along with other accusations of U.S. citizens in China.⁸² After the official establishment of the Communist regime, the PRC continued to demonstrate hostile actions and publish aggressive statements to the United States. U.S. citizens in China were being detained for the Communist government’s refusal to recognize departing visas. Also, anti-American propaganda reached its peak during the process and gradually conditions for the lean toward the Soviets increased.⁸³

Communist China’s relationship with the Soviet Union hit its peak when the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Security was signed on February 14, 1950. This treaty was a public declaration that the PRC stood by the Soviet side. The main agreement of the treaty was that the two governments would jointly carry out all necessary means to prevent an imperialistic confrontation by the Japanese or any other external forces that were related to Japan. If either was in a state of war with Japan or its allies, the other had the obligation to intervene and give military and other assistance.

After the North Koreans invaded the South in June 25, 1950, the issue of “who lost China” started to be less of an interest to the leadership and public. While the

⁸⁰ Robert Blum, *The United States and China in World Affairs* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 8.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Jian Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 43–46.

situation in Korea was being gradually contained by the UN forces, the Chinese Communist regime started to warn the United States of the possibility of its own intervention. There were threats and initial actions that signaled if the allied forces crossed the 38th parallel, the Chinese Red Army would intervene. Nonetheless United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel, leading the Chinese forces to cross the Yalu River.⁸⁴ This act and subsequent actions—such as China refusing proposals to end the fighting—led to the hardening of the U.S. position in accepting the PRC to the United Nations. Also, Communist China was condemned as an aggressor by the UN and began to be perceived as an aggressive imperial power that had a negative influence in the world.

Blum states that at the time Washington's attention was mainly focused on Europe. The leadership had no intention of putting U.S. efforts into the Chinese civil war. The U.S. position in Asia was that, with the troops in Japan and Okinawa, and with close its relationship with the Philippines, the United States did not need to waste resources in the region. Also, the leadership thought that the Chinese Communists were going to be occupied mainly with resolving issues in mainland China.

Blum ends the section by quoting Acheson and adding that,

It is clear in retrospect that while we “let the dust settle” and attempted to limit our commitments in Asia, we did not accurately foresee the consequences of what had happened in China and underestimated the ability of the Chinese Communists to unify and mobilize the country and infuse its people and policies with hostility to the United States. We vaguely hoped that the Chinese people would in time part ways with international communism, which was then seen as being tightly controlled and directed from Moscow, but not many Americans foresaw the important and distinctive role that Communist China itself would soon play in Asia and the world.⁸⁵

As observed earlier, the development of the U.S.-Communist China conflict can be divided into three sections. The conditions for the ultimate confrontation were shaped

⁸⁴ Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 151.

⁸⁵ Blum, *The United States and China in World Affairs* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 9.

by the position that China had between the United States and the Soviet Union. While the United States was forming a grand strategy for the battle against communism, the Chinese were gradually starting to lean toward the Soviet side. This research divides the U.S.-China relations into four periods with the points cited previously. The first period is before the proclamation of the PRC; the second, prior to the Sino-Soviet Treaty; the third is up until the Chinese intervention in the Korean War; and the last is after the intervention. Acheson's statements are analyzed across these four time frames.

C. ANALYSIS OF ACHESON'S STATEMENTS USING DICTION 7.0

This section presents the analysis of Acheson's statements provided by the computer-aided text analysis program DICTION 7.0. The main goal of this process is to identify a change in the “Aggression” and “Optimism” factor scores of the results. As noted in the advantages of the computer-aided content analysis program, the results are also used to reinforce the manual assessments of Acheson's statements which can be subjective—that is, affected by a biased perception of the researcher.

Before analyzing the statements with DICTION, the reasons for selecting the factors—“Aggression” and “Optimism”—must be addressed. In the previous chapter, the two factors were mentioned as having been used to analyze enemy images held by political leaders—optimism used in Hermann's study⁸⁶ and aggression used in Eckhardt and White's evaluations.⁸⁷ Besides these factors' use in other researches, it is important to know the relationship between the two factors in statements and Acheson's hostile image of China.

Elton McNeil describes a good example of personal reactions to subjects that are perceived as hostile. He states that an individual will become increasingly target-oriented and use communication of threat and aggression when hostility is recognized.⁸⁸ The signs of hostility will be perceived as threats to the individual, who will first respond with

⁸⁶ Hermann, “Some Personal Characteristics Related to Foreign Aid Voting of Congressmen,” 316.

⁸⁷ Eckhardt and White, “A Test of the Mirror-Image Hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev,” 325–327.

⁸⁸ Elton B. McNeil, “Personal Hostility and International Aggression,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 5, no. 3 (1961), 280, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/172958>.

countering threats—which will be recognized in the verbal content of the individual. Then the individual will find allies to rally against the hostile subject and again target it with aggressive forms of communication.⁸⁹ Though these results were derived from observing a group of seventy minors, McNeil connects his findings to international relations, in which he identifies similar behaviors of political leaders and their statements.⁹⁰

Another reaction to hostility can be found in a study measuring interstate affect. William Dixon presents examples of President Reagan, National Security Advisor Richard Allen, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig's statements regarding the Soviet Union. He states that like all social interactions, foreign policy behaviors—especially statements of political leaders—exhibit content of expressing an evaluation of a particular subject. If the subject is considered hostile and unfriendly, the leader will state negative or aggressive terms and expressions indicating his feelings.⁹¹ A statement by President Reagan in a press conference charging the Soviets with reserving “the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat”⁹² should be noticed.

As for optimism, Hermann presents the use of the factor in the analysis of statements. The optimistic tone in a statement indicates that the speaker is expecting a good and favorable outcome of the future and is satisfied with the present state. If an individual's attitude is positive about a particular subject, the statements he or she makes will be in an optimistic tone.⁹³

So, in this thesis, the verbal tone of aggression in the statements indicates the level of hostility Acheson perceived of Communist China and the optimistic tone, the opposite. As the study is limited to one individual, the results of the “Aggression” and “Optimism” scores will not be compared to a set standard, such as scores of other

⁸⁹ Ibid., 281.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 288.

⁹¹ William J. Dixon, “Measuring Interstate Affect,” *American Journal of Political Science* 27, no. 4 (1983), 829–830.

⁹² Ibid., 828.

⁹³ Hermann, “Some Personal Characteristics Related to Foreign Aid Voting of Congressmen,” 316.

political figures. Instead, it focuses on the pattern of the results, looking for distinctive changes in the scores. Also, though not a set standard, the score of every statement is compared with the overall average of the scores to roughly identify the pattern. The results of Acheson's statements are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. The Statements of Dean Acheson and DICTION 7.0 Analysis Results.

	Date of Statement	Title	Aggression Score	Optimism Score
			Scale: 0 to 100	
1	1949. 8. 4	Basic Principles of U.S. Policy Toward the Far East	5.60	51.93
2	1949. 10. 26	Chinese Communists Refuse Exit Visa for American Military Attaché	6.63	47.83
3	1949. 11. 23	Angus Ward Released by the Communists (Secretary Acheson Personal Letter to Thirty Nations)	5.18	49.94
4	1949. 11. 30	U.S. Protests to Chinese Communists in Smith-Bender Case	3.56	50.12
5	1950. 1. 12	Crisis in Asia, “An Examination of U.S. Policy” (Made before the national press club in Washington)	4.54	50.24
6	1950. 2. 8	Peace Goal Demands Firm Resolve	4.61	47.97
7	1950. 2. 16	Total Diplomacy to Strengthen U.S. Leadership for Human Freedom Made at a meeting of the Advertising Council at the White House	3.68	45.40

		United States Policy Toward Asia		
8	1950. 3. 15	An address delivered before the Commonwealth Club of California at San Francisco, CA	5.41	50.70
9	1950. 3. 31	Soviets Exploit Sinkiang oil and Mineral Resources	3.95	48.08
10	1950. 3. 31	Evacuation of Americans From Shanghai	2.06	48.94
11	1950. 7. 18	Prime Minister Nehru's Appeal To Settle Korean Problem by Admitting Chinese Communists to U.N. Rejected (Message of Acheson)	6.99	52.37
12	1950. 9. 10	Foreign Policies Toward Asia A television interview with secretary Acheson	6.30	50.26
		United States Foreign Policy		
13	1950. 11. 15	Extemporaneous remarks made before a National Conference on Foreign Policy held in the Department of State at Washington	5.19	50.61
		The Strategy of Freedom		
14	1950. 11. 29	Broadcast from Washington to the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States	19.13	50.99
15	1951. 1. 17	Chinese Communists Reject Cease-Fire Proposal	15.39	48.73
		Our far Eastern Policy, "Debate, Decision, and Action"		
16	1951. 4. 18	Made before the Women's National Press Club at Washington	9.74	52.32
		Peace or War and the Survival of Human Freedom		
17	1951. 6. 1	Made before the Senate Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committees on the MacArthur Hearings	22.56	47.76
		An Estimate of the Present World Situation		
18	1951. 6. 29	A stenographic transcript of remarks made off the records and from notes to a group of magazine and	8.70	47.35

		book publishers		
19	1951. 11. 13	Representation of Communist China in the U. N. Made before the U.N. General Assembly at Paris	24.17	50.27
20	1951. 12. 30	A Trial Balance of U.S. Foreign Policy in 1951 Made before the Jewish War Veterans at New York	19.20	49.88
21	1952. 3. 13	Building Collective Strength Through The Mutual Security Program	9.86	53.13
22	1952. 7. 16	Communist Assertion in Geneva Conventions	9.45	47.68
23	1952. 9. 10	Maltreatment of Americans in Communist China	26.09	44.78
24	1952. 10. 1	Press Conference Statements by Secretary Acheson	12.94	43.82
25	1952. 10. 24	The problem of Peace in Korea Made before Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly	20.42	47.90

The average of the “Aggression” score was 10.45 and the “Optimism” score was 49.16 throughout the analyzed period. From the results, one can notice that there is a significant shift in the “Aggression” scores after the statement made on November 29, 1950, though it is difficult to notice a change in the “Optimism” scores. A detailed analysis of the results is presented after the possible explanations for the pattern of the results. Since there is no standard score against which to compare whether Acheson was relatively aggressive or optimistic to the Chinese Communist, this thesis sets the standard score to the average calculated in Table 1. If Acheson’s “Aggression” score was lower than 10.45, it would indicate that he did not think of Communist China as hostile in his statement. If it was above the average it would indicate the opposite. The same logic will apply to the “Optimism” score.

D. THE MANUAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATEMENTS

This section analyzes the statements of Acheson manually. It takes into consideration the events that had happened during the period the statements were made—an attempt to reinforce the defects of the computerized process mentioned earlier. It identifies frequently used terms and expressions in certain situations that may help to identify the image of China that Acheson had.

1. Before the Proclamation of the People's Republic of China

The analysis of the statements of Acheson starts with the first period as described earlier. The first statement of Acheson is the “Basic Principles of U.S. Policy toward the Far East.” It was a comprehensive review of United States Far Eastern policy which Acheson announced in mid-July 1949. The review clearly indicated that probable changes in policy concerning China were under consideration by the policy makers. In this Acheson stated that it was a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States did not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asia area.⁹⁴ Apparently, the policy review was an attempt to make a thorough study of possible policy alternatives in the Far East—in particular, China. The main point of the attempt was to sort out difficulties over what should be carried out in the United States’ China policy.

In analyzing the statement, remarks such as “imperialist,” “foreign power,” and “clandestine means” can be found describing the Soviet influence. Another interesting point to notice can be found in the end of his speech. Acheson stated,

The Chinese Communists, in attempting to establish a totalitarian domination over the Chinese people in the interest of a foreign power and in basing this attempt on a willfully distorted concept of the world realities, are committing themselves deeply on the basis of unproved assumptions as to the extent of their own strength and the nature of the reactions which they are bound to provoke in China and elsewhere. The United States, for its part, will be prepared to work with the people of China and of every

⁹⁴ Dean Acheson and McGeorge Bundy, *The Pattern of Responsibility* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 180.

country in Asia to preserve and to promote their true interest, developed as they choose and not as dictated by any foreign imperialism.⁹⁵

Though Acheson states that the Chinese Communists were “attempting to establish a totalitarian domination,” he does not distinguish Communist China from the Soviet Union—described in the statement as a foreign power—and questions the capabilities of the Chinese Communists. He concludes by stating that the United States is ready to help the Chinese—though not the CCP—on the assumption that the Communist influence in China would come to an end. He did not specifically state that the United States would directly suppress the spreading influence of the Chinese Communist Party. Although the study analyzed a single statement, it can be noticed that Acheson used ambiguous expressions to address the Chinese Communists—while using the term “totalitarian,” there is no expression of conflict or threat. This can explain the relatively low score of 5.60 in the DICTION “Aggression” factor. The program did not identify a distinctive aggressive tone in Acheson’s statement.

This indicates that while Acheson had concerns about the future of mainland China, he did not have a hostile image of the Chinese Communists. But, as the analysis is based on limited data, the thesis will have more focus on the following events that could have influenced Acheson’s China image. On August 5, 1949, the Department of State published a statement of a new policy towards China—both the Communists and Nationalists. It was generally known as the “White Paper.” This publication is identified and regarded as the initial step taken by the United States in the withdrawal of support for Nationalist China. The White Paper indicated that the Nationalists were responsible for the defeat in the Chinese civil war and the leadership in Washington was preparing for the collapse of the regime.⁹⁶

After the “White Paper” was published it triggered a massive anti-American propaganda campaign within mainland China. Mao wrote articles that criticized the U.S.

⁹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 21 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1949), 236–237.

⁹⁶ Francis Ralph Valeo, *The China White Paper: A Summary with Commentary of the Department of State’s “United States Relations With China,” Department of State Public Affairs Bulletin*, no. 77 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1949), 15–29.

China policy and claimed that the United States was the main enemy of the Chinese people and its revolution.⁹⁷ While hostile movements against the United States were rising, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949.

2. After the Establishment of the PRC until the Formation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance

After the formal establishment of the government, the People's Republic of China requested that it be recognized by the international community as being the sole government of Mainland China. The Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, almost immediately recognized the Communist regime, including other nations that followed. The leaders in Washington were not certain of the outcomes that the Chinese influence would have in the Far East. With some ambiguity, the United States decided to stand by and watch the results that the event would have in the international community. After the Chinese Communist proclamation, events—such as detainment of U.S. personnel—triggering tension between the United States and the PRC continued.

In October 26, 1949, Acheson made a statement announcing the refusal of exit visas of an American military attaché by the Chinese Communist government. Gen. Robert B. Soule, a military attaché to China was not allowed to depart from Nanking until a payment of severance was made. In his statement, Acheson refers to the actions of the Communist authorities that prevented the departure as “flimsy.”⁹⁸ The definition of “flimsy” is “lacking in physical strength or substance,” “of inferior materials and workmanship,” and “having little worth or plausibility.”⁹⁹ Also, Acheson leaves an ambiguous ending to the statement by saying, “It is apparent that the failure to issue permits was due either to negligence on the part of the Chinese Communist authorities concerned or to deliberate discrimination against American officials.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 43.

⁹⁸ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 21, PT2, 709–710.

⁹⁹ Webster's Dictionary online, s.v. “flimsy,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/flimsy>.

¹⁰⁰ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 21, PT2, 710.

In the process of forming a China policy, Acheson and the department were frequently attacked by political officials for failure to confront the Communists in China. There was such constant criticism of the Department's White Paper that Acheson had to refute the charges in a statement.¹⁰¹ In a situation where the policy decisions of the Department were being questioned, one would assume that an event like this—the mistreatment of U.S. citizens by the PRC officials—would be an adequate opportunity to take the advantage by stating or acting aggressively against Communist China in order to ease domestic tensions. However, as can be observed in the terms used, Acheson did make remarks that indicated an inferior status of the PRC, but did not necessarily make aggressive comments and expressions towards the Chinese Communists. Although there is a rise in the “Aggression” score of 6.63, it is relatively lower than the average.

Next the study examines a personal letter by Acheson sent to thirty nations in which Acheson's remarks indicate an inferior image of the PRC. In his letter Acheson emphasizes the basic rules of the international community. He uses terms such as “the international practice of civilized countries,” and “basic concepts of international relations” to point out the absence of general knowledge on the part of the Communist Chinese authorities.¹⁰² A similar notion can be found in the statement released on November 30, 1949. In informing the public about the detainment of Chief Electrician William C. Smith and Master Sergeant Elmer C. Bender, Acheson stated, “The Chinese Communist authorities are apparently unaware that the international practice of civilized countries for many years has recognized that consuls should be afforded full opportunity for the proper conduct of their duties in the protection of their nationals.”¹⁰³ This statement regarding similar events cited earlier constantly refers to the Communist Chinese as ignorant and immature rather than in terms of that indicate aggression—also noticed on the “Aggression” score which drops to 3.56 and a rise in the “Optimism” score.

¹⁰¹ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 21, PT1 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1949), 350.

¹⁰² U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 21, PT1, 800.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 926.

In a speech delivered to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, it was clearly indicated what Acheson thought about Communist China. He argued that the reason for the fall of the Nationalist government was the Nationalists themselves—not the strength of the Chinese Communists—and that Communist China was incapable and weak. Again, Acheson did not use aggressive terms to describe the PRC in the statement, which keeps the “Aggression” score below the average.

Only one faction, the Communists, up in the hills, ill-equipped, ragged, a very small military force, was determinedly opposed to his position. ...The Communists did not create this. The Communists did not create this condition. They did not create this revolutionary spirit. They did not create a great force which moved out from under Chiang Kai-Shek. But they were shrewd and cunning to mount it, to ride this thing into victory and into power.¹⁰⁴

Also, Acheson continues the speech blaming the Russians, that they are responsible for the communist movement in China. The Chinese were being deceived by the “Communistic concept and techniques that have armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration,” and it is the “first and the greatest rule in regard to the formulation of American policy toward Asia” to “not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger, and the wrath, and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop.”¹⁰⁵ He again points out his views of the Chinese people and the Soviets planning in a press conference on February 8, 1950.¹⁰⁶

The remarks that place the blame on the Soviets can be found in a meeting at the White House in the same month. In his comments on creating situations of strength to deal with the Soviet Union, Acheson made a remark about the Chinese Communists stating

The Communists took over China at a ridiculously small cost. What they [the Soviet Union] did was to invite some Chinese leaders who were

¹⁰⁴ Acheson, “Relations of the Peoples of the United States and the Peoples of Asia,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 16, no. 8 (February 1950), 239–240. <http://vsotd.com/issue/1950-8/relations-peoples-united-states-and-peoples-asia-january-12-1050>.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 240–241.

¹⁰⁶ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 22, PT1 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1950), 273.

dissatisfied with the way things were going in their country to come to Moscow. There, they thoroughly indoctrinated them so that they returned to China prepared to resort to any means whatsoever to establish Communist control. They were completely subservient to the Moscow regime.¹⁰⁷

As seen in this excerpt, Acheson clearly made statements about China that described China as inferior to international standards, and emphasized that cunning Soviet influence was the main reason for the ignorant Chinese people falling into communism. He does not make statements with aggressive terms towards the PRC, which indicates that Acheson did not perceive Communist China as hostile.

The consistency in the remarks of Acheson with regard to the Chinese Communists can be explained by two reasons. First, Acheson had not yet established a confirmed stance regarding the China policy that the PRC was a hostile state. As the United States' foreign policy was focused on fighting communism, there was a possibility that Acheson was mainly interested in tensions with the Soviet Union. The terms that were used to describe the Soviet Union support this idea. While addressing the Chinese Communists with terms that express their weakness, the Soviet Union was defined as “imperialist” and “insidious”¹⁰⁸ in character. Acheson also emphasized that the primary rule in the formulation of American policy toward Asia was not to abandon the needs of the Asian countries under the threat of Soviet influence—specifically pointing out China.¹⁰⁹ So, while labeling the main adversary as the Soviet Union, there was also a possibility that Acheson had hopes that the PRC was not fully committed to Soviet Communism, and in the future, would have normal diplomatic relations with the United States. Russell D. Buhite supports this idea by arguing that the leadership in Washington expected China to play a stabilizing role in Asia, and hoped to establish a pro-American China as a counterpoint to the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 429.

¹⁰⁸ *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 240–241.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 241.

¹¹⁰ Russell D. Buhite, “Major Interests: American Policy toward China, Taiwan, and Korea, 1945–1950,” *Pacific Historical Review* 47, no. 3 (1978), 428, <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3637474?uid=3739560&uid=2129&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21102556839547>

Another reason for the constant remarks of Acheson is that he could have simply questioned the capabilities of the PRC or the Chinese people in general. Terry Lautz states that the American public image of China was that of a somewhat inferior race. While the Americans were fascinated by Chinese culture, a “weak, disorganized China was treated with disdain.”¹¹¹ Also the public saw the spread of poverty and disease in China which eventually stimulated the formation of an image of the Chinese people as benighted and heathen, in need of redemption. Uneducated workers from China who came to work at hard labor in gold mines and railroad construction in the western United States formed lurid Chinese images in America.¹¹² Also, before the establishment of the communist regime, China had been a colony and been at civil war for a long period. The generally poor image of China could have affected Acheson’s cognition process. In his statements Communist China is expressed with terms such as “ill-equipped” and “ragged.”¹¹³ This could indicate that Acheson actually thought that the Chinese Communists were manipulated by the Soviets and did not have the capacity to sustain its regime, and it would eventually collapse or cooperate with the superior United States.

Even after the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, which meant that mainland China had become one of the biggest Communist regimes, Acheson constantly used terms in official statements with less aggressive attitude. Even after Chinese actions that could be interpreted as anti-American, Acheson did not use terms that express aggression or protest. The majority of his speeches had a tone that the Chinese people were innocently taken over by Soviet Communists, and that the newly formed PRC was unaccustomed to the basic rules of the international system. For whatever reason, it can be concluded Acheson did not take Communist China seriously. More importantly, this

¹¹¹ Terry Lautz, “U.S. Views of China: History, Values, and Power,” in *The United States and China: Mutual Public Perceptions*, ed. Douglas G. Spelman (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), 11, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/KICUS_Mut_Pub_Perc_WEB.pdf.

¹¹² Ibid., 12.

¹¹³ *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 239–240.

indicated that despite the anti-American movements and the provocations, Acheson did not perceive the PRC by a hostile image which can be seen in his statements and scores of the DICTION results.

3. After the Sino-Soviet Treaty to the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War

With the signing of “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” on February 14, 1950, the PRC secured a major supporter in the Soviet Union. The two governments agreed to preserve the security of both countries, maintain peace in Asia and the World, and strengthen their friendship. Also, they agreed to promote the cause of socialist construction of the two countries.¹¹⁴ This was a major event that could have affected Acheson’s image of a Communist China that was hostile to the United States.

On March 15, 1950, Acheson delivered a speech about U.S. policy towards Asia. While speaking of Soviet intentions in Asia, Acheson states regarding to the Sino-soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of February 14, 1950, that the “Chinese people may welcome these promises and assurances. But they will not fail, in time, to see where they fall short of China’s real needs and desires. And they will wonder about the points upon which the agreements remain silent.”¹¹⁵

Also, in speaking of fundamental attitudes of Asians, Acheson stated that China, with its long proud history, was being forced into the Soviet orbit as a dependency of the Soviet political system and the Soviet economy.¹¹⁶

While stating these political assurances, Acheson also made a statement regarding the Sino-Soviet Treaty saying that

As old friends, we say to the Chinese people that we fully understand that their present unhappy status within the orbit of the Soviet Union is not the result of any choice of their own part, but has been forced upon them. We

¹¹⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance,” last modified Nov 17, 2000, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao/3602/3604/t18011.htm>.

¹¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 22, PT2 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1950), 468.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

understand that the Communist basis for their Government is similarly not the result of any free choice of their own...We do not intend to engage in any aggressive adventures against them. The American people will remain in the future, as we have been in the past, the friends of the Chinese people.¹¹⁷

In addressing the attitude of the U.S. regarding China, Acheson stated, “Again, as old friends of the Chinese people, we say to them that the representatives of our country are leaving them not by any wish of ours....We regret this leaving by our people, but our Chinese friends will understand again where the responsibility lies.¹¹⁸“

As seen above, in Acheson’s statements, terms regarding China had not significantly changed. Even after the communist treaty, Acheson constantly blames the Soviet side for the takeover in China, and that the Soviets intentions were to deceive and exploit the Chinese. Acheson makes a similar remark in a statement released to the press in March 31, 1950. It was specifically about the Soviet exploit of Sinkang oil and mineral resources. Acheson used the terms “exploit,” “impairment,” and “relinquishment” to describe the Soviet actions against Communist China. It can be noticed that the term “impooverished” was used to modify the PRC.¹¹⁹

On June 25, 1950, when Communist North Korea invaded the South, the focus of U.S. attention in Asia was suddenly turned from China to Korea. The United States was almost immediately involved in the conflict by sending troops into South Korea. At the same time, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to position itself between mainland China and Taiwan. This action was an attempt to neutralize Taiwan and prevent it from being a point of danger upon the flank of the United Nations position. Truman neutralized the straits by stating that the Seventh Fleet would prevent any attack upon Taiwan, and Taiwan should not make any attack upon the mainland.¹²⁰ With the major commitment in the Korean War, the U.S. put the China problem temporarily aside.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 22, PT2, 469.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 470.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 22, PT2, 568.

¹²⁰ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 23, PT2 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1950), 463.

With Korea in focus, Acheson's position regarding Communist China can be observed in his message of July 18, 1950. This was a message replying to the Indian ambassador's appeal to settle the conflict in Korea by admitting the PRC to the UN. While not fully recognizing the regime, he also did not entirely reject it—stating that the “the decision … for China’s seat in the United Nations is one which must be reached by the United Nations on its merits.”¹²¹

After the successful Incheon landing that started on September 15, 1950, and ended on September 19, there were concerns in Washington about the possibilities of Chinese intervention in the Korean War. There had been a number of signs from the Chinese that indicated an increase in tension, and official warnings to the U.S.—although delivered by a mediator—that China would intervene if the U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel. While there were concerns, on September 10, 1950, in a television interview regarding policies on Asia, Secretary Acheson replied to the question from Griffin Bancroft, a staff member of CBS in Washington, about the chances of Chinese Communists getting involved in the support of the Korean Communists. Acheson stated that,

I would think it would be sheer madness on the part of the Chinese Communist to do that, and I see no advantage to them in doing it....Now I give the people in Peiping credit for being intelligent enough to see what is happening to them. Why they should want to further their own dismemberment and destruction by getting at cross purposes with all the free nations of the world who are inherently their friends and have always been friends of the Chinese as against this imperialism coming down from the Soviet Union I cannot see. And since there is nothing in it for them, I don't see why they should yield to what is undoubtedly pressures from the Communist movement to get into this Korean row.¹²²

¹²¹ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 23, PT1 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1950), 171.

¹²² U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 23, PT1 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1950), 463.

Also, Acheson answered the question whether the United States had written off Asia by saying, “We still believe that the Chinese are going to be Chinese before they are going to be Communists.”¹²³

By examining these statements, we can conclude that Acheson had a clear position regarding the possibility of the PRC’s involvement in the Korean War—Communist China would not intervene because it would be “sheer madness” to do so. The imperialistic character of the Soviet Union that was mentioned before in Acheson’s statements is again stated in the interview as well. Another expression that described the Chinese should be noticed. Acheson’s remark about China being “Chinese before they are going to be Communist” indicates that Acheson did not yet perceive the PRC as a fully committed Communist regime, and that the China’s ideology was more nationalistic than imperialistic. This could mean that Acheson fundamentally acknowledged China not as an enthusiastic participant in a Soviet plan, but as an incomplete government which had the possibility of negotiation and normal relations with the United States in the future.

Another interesting point is that Acheson did not even consider the possibility of the PRC’s influence in initiating the Korean War. Now with the de-classified documents, evidence of Mao approving Kim Il-Sung’s plan of invasion has been revealed.¹²⁴ Though there could have been discussions within the foreign policy-making circle and preparation for alternative options, Acheson stood by and pursued his belief that the PRC would not intervene.

The Sino-Soviet treaty—which could have been interpreted as a full commitment to the Communist act—did not particularly change the rhetoric in Acheson’s statements. Also, while the non-aggressive U.S. position should have led to better treatment of Americans on the Chinese side, particularly the diplomatic personnel in China, the Communist officials, adding to the disrespect already shown American diplomats in China—such as the arrest and detention of an American group for almost a month in late

¹²³ Ibid., 464.

¹²⁴ Jian Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 54.

1949—seized the United States’ consular property in Beijing.¹²⁵ But, even after the aggressive actions against the United States, Acheson’s statements concerning Communist China remained constant; China was incapable, and was being deceived by the Soviets. Even after Chinese actions that indicated military action against the UN forces in the Korean War, it seemed to Acheson that the threats were not credible and he remained positive that Communist China would not live up to its words.

In an attempt to explain the reasons for Acheson’s constant position on China, it would be valid to apply the reasons that were brought up earlier—he had not yet established a firm decision that the PRC was hostile to the Americans, or that he could have doubted the capability of Communist China to become an obstacle in the future. Though the escalating anti-American sentiment and threats—in particular, Chinese opposition of UN forces crossing the 38th parallel—were rising, Acheson did not take Communist China seriously. The DICTION analysis of the statements made after the Sino-Soviet Alliance and before the Chinese intervention in the Korean War concludes that Acheson did not use aggressive terms to describe Communist China. While there was a slight rise in the “Aggression” scores during the period and a decrease in the “Optimism” score, it still is below average of the total score. This indicates that while there were events—China’s lean to the Soviet side and continuing threats of intervention in the Korean War—that could have shifted Acheson’s image of the PRC, he still did not think of Communist China in terms of a hostile image.

4. After the Chinese Intervention in the Korean War

In early November of 1950, armies of the Chinese Communist government carried out an offensive that resulted in the longest retreat of U.S. forces in history. Acheson’s first official statement regarding the Chinese intervention in the war was to clear intentions of the United States. He informed the public that the United States reassured the Chinese that there were no intentions toward their territory. Also, if U.S. actions were misread, the PRC should stop intervening in the Korean War. In the end,

¹²⁵ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 22, PT1, 32, 406, 462, 487, 525, 568, 630, 755.

Acheson added that if the Chinese actions were driven by other reasons, they would be met by “all the resolutions, and all the soberness, and all the wisdom” of the United States.¹²⁶ It should be noticed that while trying to address the situation delicately, expressions that could be thought aggressive began to appear. In a broadcast, later in the month, Acheson confirmed that the Chinese Communists had full acknowledgement that there were no U.S. intentions in China, and that they deceived the world—there were initial preparations of intervention before the Korean War and that the “cloak of pretense had been thrown off.”¹²⁷

Negative terms appear more frequently as the war with the Chinese Communists continued. Commenting on the PRC’s rejection of the cease-fire proposal, Acheson stated that it was “evidence of their contemptuous disregard of a world-wide demand for peace,” and that people should “face squarely and soberly the fact that the Chinese Communists have no intentions of ceasing their defiance.”¹²⁸ In addressing the U.S. Far Eastern policy, Chinese actions were expressed as the “veil” of “shabby pretense of aggression.”¹²⁹ Also, Acheson referred the Chinese regime as the “Red leaders,”¹³⁰ and in an address before the UN General Assembly, he commented about the Chinese demand for representation in the UN as a “level of barbarism.”¹³¹ Aggressive terms that describe China can be constantly found in Acheson’s statements and addresses—“the aggressor,” “communist treachery.”¹³² Sarcastic remarks can also be noticed—in a press conference Acheson made extemporaneous remarks to a question about Beijing’s “Peace Conferences.” He replied by stating that the conference was,

¹²⁶ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 23, PT1, 855.

¹²⁷ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 23, PT2, 963.

¹²⁸ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 24, PT1 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1951), 164.

¹²⁹ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 24, PT2 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1951), 686.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 925.

¹³¹ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 25, PT2, 925.

¹³² U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 26, PT1 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1952), 5.

an obvious propaganda operation in which the Chinese Communists, while taking an active part in defying the United Nations and carrying the war into Korea and while joining with the Soviet Government in its violent “hate campaign,” are continuing to hold “peace conferences.”¹³³

Another interesting change to notice is that, before the Chinese intervention, China had been described as a helpless nation deceived by the Soviets and ignorant of its actions. After months of war, Acheson stated—in a metaphorical expression—that the Chinese knew the consequences of their actions and used communism as a tool to influence the world. Comments on the strength of communist propaganda also show a change in attitude. Stating that the “masses of people in China are organized effectively against us, so that they are a very strong opponent,”¹³⁴ indicate that the leadership was starting to perceive China in a different view—the opposite image of a weak Communist regime. The shift from an incapable image of China can be also found in a comment that characterized the Communist forces. In the past, the Communist bloc was usually referred to as the “Soviets and its satellites,” but in an address made at Detroit, Acheson explicitly stated the Communist armed forces in the order of the Soviets, the Chinese Communists, and the European satellites. It was the first time that the Chinese Communists were described by their own name rather than as a Soviet satellite.

Chinese actions were expressed in terms of less tolerance also. Replying to a question at a press conference about whether the Red Chinese were prepared to adhere to the Geneva Conventions, Acheson stated “none of them have been adhered to in practice, although they said at the outset that they were going to do so.”¹³⁵ In the past, Chinese actions were eased off by expressions of an ignorant and ill-educated of the communist government—that the PRC was not familiar with the international rules and standards. But in a press conference in early September of 1952—regarding the maltreatment of American citizens in China—terms such as “brutal callousness” and “third-degree

¹³³ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 27, PT1 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1952), 570.

¹³⁴ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 25, PT1 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1951), 126.

¹³⁵ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 27, PT1, 172.

methods”¹³⁶ were used to express Chinese actions. Acheson ended his statement by saying, “These Communist crimes will be forever condemned by those who believe in simple justice and fair play for human beings.”¹³⁷ This change in terminology should be compared with the terms that described earlier Chinese actions against American citizens in China.

The last point to note is the statements that inform the public of Communist China’s preparation for war. Acheson’s earlier statements clearly indicate that due to lack of military capability the Chinese would not intervene. After the intervention, evidence of a possible Chinese action—some that were neglected before—as emphasized, resulted in the hardening of aggressive feelings towards Communist China.¹³⁸

It could be said that all wavering towards China was thoroughly eliminated after the active Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. Any thought of the chance of U.S. support for the PRC was abruptly ended both within and outside official government circles. All aspects of policy towards the PRC were now directed at weakening the Communist regime—recognition, admission to the United Nations, trade, etc. This was seen not only in executive actions, but in legislative movements as well. There was a resolution passed by Congress in late January of 1951, urging that the United Nations brand Communist China as an aggressor and also that the Communists should not be admitted to the United Nations. This indicated that Acheson now perceived Communist China with a hostile image which was reflected in policy decisions.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 440.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 27, PT2 (Washington, DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1951), 686.

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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS

This chapter analyzes the results and findings from the previous chapter. It attempts to connect the possible turning points in the U.S.-China relations with the results of DICTION 7.0. Then with the findings from the manual assessment, it tries to explain the patterns and changes, and thus prove the hypothesis.

A. ASSESSMENT OF U.S.-COMMUNIST CHINA RELATIONS

This section examines U.S.-Communist China relations during the periods analyzed previously. Since the degree of a relationship between two countries cannot be evaluated and determined by a numerical value, it is important to define a method in which the relationship can be expressed. Therefore, in this assessment, the relationship of the two countries is determined by examining whether the Communist Chinese leaned toward the United States or the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union—the main communist influencer—was the prime enemy of the United States. Actions such as embracing communism or allying with the Soviets were considered to be an act of threat to the U.S. Grand Strategy. Therefore, examining whether the Chinese were leaning to either the United States or the Soviet Union side can present a good perspective in determining U.S.-Communist China relations.

In the timeline of U.S.-China relations, it could be noticed that the Chinese Communists gradually began to lean to the Soviet side. With anti-American actions, such as detention of U.S. citizens and allying with the primary enemy of the United States, from the proclamation of the PRC to the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, it can be stated that the Chinese shifted farther away from the U.S. side as time passed—meaning the U.S.-China relationship deteriorated during the period.

B. ASSESSMENT OF THE DICTION 7.0 RESULTS

In this section, the results of the analysis that indicate the level of “Aggression” and “Optimism” are examined. First, the research looks into the “Aggression” factor. Figure 1 shows the aggressiveness the program recognized in Acheson’s statements.

Point 1 indicates the time of the proclamation of the PRC, Point 2 the Sino-Soviet Alliance, and Point 3 the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.




Figure 1. Aggression Score of Acheson's Statements

According to the results, during periods 1 through 3, the aggressiveness in the statements did not significantly change. From the lowest score of 3.56 to the highest of 6.99, the scores keep an average of 4.9. After the program analyzed statements past point 3, it can be identified that the scores significantly increased. From the lowest score of 8.7 to the highest of 26.09, in the period past point 3, the average of the aggression score is 17.2.

So, with these results, it can be stated that during the period when Communist China's government was being established and the Sino-Soviet Treaty was being signed, and threats regarding the UN forces crossing the 38th parallel emerged, Acheson's

statements had less aggressiveness than in the latter period when the Chinese intervened. This indicates that Acheson did not consider Communist China as having a hostile image in the beginning. However, that view eventually changed after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

Next, the study examines the “Optimism” factor of the results (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Optimism Score of Acheson’s Statements.

Figure 2 shows the optimism the program identified in Acheson’s statements. Points 1, 2, and 3 indicate the same events that were mentioned earlier. According to the results, during periods 1 through 3 and beyond, although there is a decrease after the Sino-Soviet alliance, the optimism in the statements did not significantly change. Contrasting with the “Aggressiveness” results, the optimism score had an average of 49.6 in periods 1 through 3, and an average of 48.7 in the latter period.

The “Optimism” results differed dramatically from the results of “Aggression.” Although there was a decrease in the scores after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, a significant change in the pattern cannot be identified. This indicates that despite the fact that there was a change in the rhetoric of Acheson’s speeches—as seen in the “Aggression” scores—some elements were constantly reflected in the statements, causing the optimistic tone to remain stable. This observation is examined in the next section.

C. ASSESSMENT OF THE MAIN TERMS THAT DESCRIBE COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE TIMELINE

As shown in the previous examination, there are distinctive terms—which also reflect the images of Communist China—that Acheson used to describe the Chinese Communists during the defined periods. While using different terms, it can be observed that there is a significant change in Acheson’s statements after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Figure 3 shows a summarized version of the terms that Secretary Acheson used to describe the Chinese Communists.




Figure 3. Terms Used to Describe Communist China.

Before the proclamation of the PRC, Acheson states that Communist China is being deceived in the Soviet movement to communism, and mostly shows aggression toward the Soviets. After the proclamation, the aggressive rhetoric regarding the Soviets has not changed. Even in statements protesting the maltreatment of U.S. citizens in China, terms that depict an immature government that does not know any better are used instead of strong language with aggressive connotations. The Sino-Soviet Treaty, which was a statement to the world that mainland China was a now main supporter of the Soviet Union, did not change Acheson's perception of the Chinese. Aggressive terms against the Soviets are constantly used while expressions of sympathy and compassion are used to describe the Chinese. It is interesting to note that within these periods, positive

expressions that indicate a chance that Communist China would realize the Soviet deception and be a normal member of the international community are used in Acheson's statements.

After the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, terms that describe Communist China change dramatically; the Chinese Communists are characterized as having deliberately deceived the rest of the world by secretly planning and aiding the North Korean attack in the Korean War, and that its intention to join the United Nations was part of a communist plot. This change in rhetoric significantly differs from the sorts of expressions used before. The United States had a passive view of the submission of the PRC to the UN, and also, Acheson precisely stated that the Chinese did not have the ability to intervene in the Korean War. After the event, however, reports of the PRC's military capabilities and its initial preparations can be constantly observed in Acheson's statements.

Therefore, according to this analysis, Acheson initially did have a perception or image of a weak and incapable Communist China that did not have the ability to influence the American strategy in Asia. Also, Acheson clearly thought that the Chinese Communists had a possibility to escape the Soviet influence and have normal relations with the United States. But after the Chinese intervention, Acheson's perception of and hopes for Communist China changed.

D. FINAL ANALYSIS

After examining the scores of the DICTON 7.0 program, one initial assumption of the research did not match the results. In the beginning, it was thought that the "optimism" score results would be in inverse proportion to the "aggression" score. It was stated earlier that the research would try to observe the rise in aggression and the decrease in optimism during the timeline. After analyzing the results, it was observed that while the aggression scores changed dramatically, the optimistic tone of Acheson's statements remained fairly constant during the period examined. These contradicting results lead to the question of the validity of the argument. The conditions of proving the hypothesis right was that the "Aggression" score would increase and the "Optimism"

score decrease after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Thus, the study next explains the possible reason why DICTION 7.0 presented these results, and finds evidence to support the argument that although the results are unexpected, it does not affect the conclusion that Acheson developed a hostile image of Communist China after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

Through this research, it was revealed that—in a speech or statement—the tone of optimism is not necessarily in inverse to the tone of aggression. This means that these factors can be applied as different indicators in identifying a certain tone in a statement. Although the results can raise questions regarding the use of the “Optimism” factor in the analysis, it has also helped identify a certain image of Communist China. While it can be thought that Acheson’s positive and optimistic image of Communist China shifted to a hostile one, the results lead to the question of whether the Secretary ever had an optimistic image of Communist China. Whatever the answer is, there was no shift in the optimism tone. Since the research was limited to Acheson only, it cannot compare the results to a specific standard to identify the level of optimism he had of the Communist Chinese. But, by analyzing his statements manually, the pre-existing image that Acheson had of Communist China, which was that it was weak and less capable, can be noticed. These terms and expressions do not affect the “Optimism” results of the program.

When using the DICTION 7.0 program to analyze the results, “Communist China” and “Chinese Communist” were applied to specify the search for the subject. Also, in the manual analysis process, the research took into account only the terms and expressions—including modifiers and metaphors—regarding Communist China. The researcher finds that this was the problem in the relatively constant scores in the “Optimism” rating. As seen in the manual analysis for the explanations of the DICTION results, while changes in aggressive terms that describe Communist China can be found in the statements, terms and expressions that indicate a positive and optimistic view of Communist China cannot be found throughout Acheson’s statements. The terms that described Communist China were mainly about the weakness of the regime’s status—such as “ill-equipped” and “exploited.”

The following are two analyzed statements with the highest and the lowest “Aggression” score, respectively. The first statement the “Maltreatment of Americans in Communist China”—with the highest score of 26.09—represent Acheson’s shift to a hostile China image. In the statement the Chinese Communists’ demands were referred to as “barbarism”¹³⁹ while Acheson opposed the PRC’s submission to the UN. In the statement, terms that indicate a positive and optimistic view of China cannot be found. The second statement, “Evacuation of Americans from Shanghai”—with the lowest score of 2.06—does not refer to the PRC authorities in specific aggressive terms or in positive and optimistic ones. The terms and expressions that described Communist China before the Chinese intervention in the Korean War were mainly about the inferior status of the regime, reflecting Acheson’s image of China.

The results of the “Optimism” factor imply that in performing a content analysis there are more factors to consider for more objective and accurate results. External factors, such as certain events influencing the statement, should be simultaneously considered when using the content analysis method. Also, though not used directly to support the hypothesis, the results revealed Acheson’s possible pre-existing image of Communist China. The Secretary thought that the Communist Chinese were weak and less capable in influence, which later changed as seen in the “Aggressive” score.

With the explanation of the consistency of the “optimistic” score and its implications, the three assessments—the U.S.-China relations, the manual assessment of Acheson’s statements, and the DICTION 7.0 assessment results—should be examined. The research was to test the hypothesis that the Chinese intervention in the Korean War was the main factor that formed a hostile image of China, which dominated the U.S. China policy until the normalization of U.S.-China relations. In the earlier part of this thesis, images and perceptions and how they are externally expressed were mentioned—in the form of statements in general cases. By analyzing statements of the individual

¹³⁹ U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, no. 24, PT2, 917.

regarding the events that happened in the course of U.S.-China relations, the research intended to find certain patterns in the rhetoric that could indicate the general perception of an individual and how those perception change.

According to the events that occurred during the time period that was examined, U.S.-China relations deteriorated increasingly. At the same time the United States was initiating a strategy of containing communism and the influence of the Soviet Union in particular, the deteriorating relations with Communist China did not specifically affect U.S. China policy—despite the hostile actions of the PRC toward the United States that followed. Following the event of the communist takeover in China—the proclamation of the PRC, the Sino-Soviet Alliance, the detention and maltreatment of U.S. citizens in China—the United States had a rather wavering policy and actions in regard to the Communist Chinese. After the Chinese intervened in the Korean War, a firm China policy started to form in Washington.

In general, when forming a foreign policy in regard to another country, there are simple factors to consider. When one country takes aggressive actions against another country, it is common sense to form a defensive strategy or take action to stop the hostile actions. Also, when one country forms an alliance with another country that is regarded as a primary enemy, it is necessary to think that the alliance will be threatening to one's interests. In the course of the Communist Chinese leaning toward the Soviets, U.S. actions to delay or stop the formation of an anti-American community in East Asia cannot be specifically seen. Why did the leadership not take any precise actions to prevent the outcome of these events?

The hypothesis answers the question and the question why the U.S. leadership did not take initial actions to prevent the Chinese intervention from the beginning. It can be stated that the weak and incapable image of China held by the U.S. policy makers caused them to disregard China as a factor of influence in America's Grand Strategy. This notion can be supported by the results our research obtained. In assessing the statements of Acheson—regarded as one of the most important individuals in the making of foreign policy—a constant expression of a weak and incapable China, and also for a chance of

positive relations between the United States and Communist China was observed. This consistency was also supported by more objective evidence from examining the analysis results from the DICTION 7.0 program.

While the Chinese Communists were gradually leaning toward the Soviets, there was no dramatic change in the main terms that described China in Acheson's statements until a certain point, the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. The "Aggressive" score results show a similar pattern with the chart of terms used to describe Communist China—where the change in the previous consistency was at the point of Chinese intervention. This suggests that Acheson, despite the Chinese leaning to the Soviet side, did not set a firm China policy because he held a non-aggressive image of a weak and incapable China. After the intervention, the results show a change in the terms that are used to characterize China, and also the change in the "aggression" score that matches this change.

V. CONCLUSION

After the normalization of relations with the PRC—and China's corresponding economic rise over the last thirty years—the United States and China have expanded their relations on various issues. Now that China is the world's second largest economy, Washington urges the Chinese leaders to play an active and cooperative role in balancing and sustaining global development. The U.S. leadership hopes that China, as a member of the United Nations Security Council, will engage positively in international security issues such as nuclear threats and territorial disputes—being a stabilizer in the Asia-Pacific region. Also in a bilateral relationship, the United States cooperates with the Chinese government to set rules and norms that would both benefit the material and intellectual exchanges between the two countries. Meanwhile, U.S. policy makers take steps to discourage and make regulations for China's illegal activities such as cyber intrusions and violations of intellectual property rights in the trading process.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, now that the United States and China are the world's biggest contributors to greenhouse gas emissions, bilateral efforts to reduce global warming are being observed.

While relations between the two countries seem to be making progress, there are still concerns about whether the Chinese will be a responsible stakeholder in the future.¹⁴¹ Though China does not possess the military or the economic capabilities to match the United States, many are worried about the consequences of the shift in power—such as China's economic dominance in the Asian region.¹⁴² Questions are being raised whether the United States and China can manage the relationship and avoid confrontation.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Theodore H. Moran, "Dealing with Cybersecurity Threats Posed by Globalized Information Technology," Peterson Institute for International Economics PB13-11 (2013), 1–2.

¹⁴¹ Jia Qingguo, "Learning to Live with the Hegemon: Evolution of China's Policy toward the U.S. Since the End of the Cold War," *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 44 (2005), 407, doi: 10.1080/10670560500115036.

¹⁴² Bonnie S. Glaser, "China's Coercive Economic Diplomacy—A New and Worrying Trend," *Pacific Forum CSIS* 46 (2012), 2, https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/748a341c-3ef9-4a5d-944f-efbeb5462959/Class%202017%3A%20China_s%20Relations%20with%20the%20World/Glaser-China_s%20Economic%20Coercion.pdf.

¹⁴³ Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 142.

In a report on policies regarding U.S.-China relations, Susan V. Lawrence a specialist in Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service notes that there is still an ongoing mistrust between the countries. The U.S. talks of new cooperation with the Chinese are considered to be a strategy to balance the Chinese influence in the region by many observers. She also brings up the issue of the different political systems as being one of the reasons for mistrust. The Americans are disturbed by the authoritative form and actions that the Chinese government practices, and the Chinese leaders are threatened by the pressures that U.S. leaders give on the issues of basic human rights and treatment.¹⁴⁴

Lawrence also states that the mistrust is especially emphasized on security issues. The Chinese government perceives the U.S. presence in Asia as part of a containment strategy, while the U.S. government considers the People's Liberation Army's modernization as a step to deter U.S. movements in the region, which could later challenge U.S. influence. Cyber security threats as well as the actual display of military capabilities are being frequently observed, making the mistrust deepen.¹⁴⁵

While there have been improvements in the channels of communication between the two countries, the actual intentions of both countries cannot be precisely determined. Systems that provide reliable information about the intentions and the perceptions of the other are needed in order to make good policy decisions. A perception the one country has regarding another is also crucially important, because policy decisions are made by individuals who can be affected by existing images. So, knowing the image the opponent has of one's own country can be used as the basis of forming a good policy. In the U.S.-China case, if the leadership in Washington has reliable information of what the U.S. image is to the Chinese and the Chinese have the same for the United States, there can be better understanding of the others' actions, which will lead to the reduction of mistrust to some degree. A reliable method in comparing images to reality is needed.

¹⁴⁴ Susan V. Lawrence, *U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues*, CRS Report R41108 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August, 2013), 2, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41108.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 2–3.

This research started with the initial task of learning the early modern U.S.-China relations. It started to question why there is a commonly held mistrust between the two countries and when the negative images of one another began. It set out to prove the hypothesis that the image of China that America held shifted after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, and possibly why. After selecting an important individual who could influence the formation of U.S. foreign policy, the research used a content analysis method to examine the image of China held in Washington. To support the assessment, a computer-based analysis was used to obtain more objective evidence. It was concluded that before the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Acheson's image of Communist China was one of weakness and incapability. Although the Communist Chinese government took actions that could be perceived as a threat to the United States—such as being a major communist regime, allying with the Soviet Union, and threatening to intervene in the Korean War—Acheson did not regard China with a hostile image. After the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, Acheson adopted a hostile China image which affected his policy decisions regarding U.S.-China relations.

The methods in determining the U.S. China image in the research can have multiple implications. First, it was an attempt to support the existing arguments that the Chinese intervention in the Korean War was the main reason for the shift in the China image—while many literatures claim the Korean War as the main point, most do not present any evidence to support the argument. The identification of frequently used terms and the results from an analysis program provide the literature with more objective evidence.

Second, statements made by a political figure can be used in the study of political phenomena. While examining the statements of Acheson, it was revealed that certain patterns and changes regarding a specific subject can be identified. In Acheson's case, the wavering political actions matched his use of terms that characterized a weak China and less aggression in the tone of his speeches. After the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the firm China policy—actively opposing the PRC submission to the UN, forming a containment policy—matched the use of terms that characterized a hostile and aggressive China and an increase in the aggressive tone of Acheson's speeches. This implies that

when examining a political figure or the political decisions made, analyzing the statements on the subject can be useful to the research.

The method used in this study can be applied to the current concerns in U.S.-ROK relations. While the Republic of Korea has been one of the main allies of the United States in Asia, questions are increasing whether the Koreans will keep their commitment in the alliance, as ties with the Chinese increase.¹⁴⁶ Park Bun-Soon talks about the Chinese efforts to pursue economic cooperation of Asian countries in Northeast Asia. He demonstrates that after the normalization between South Korea and China, and China's economic reform, Korea's main trading partner has shifted from the United States to China.¹⁴⁷ With increasing economic interdependence, the current trend in cultural exchange, and the proximity of the two countries show the potential for a strong relationship. Also, there are fewer conflicts of interest between Korea and China. From a realistic perspective, the conditions for the ROK to ally itself with the Chinese are better than that of any other country in the region. This is raising concerns—some state that the relationship resembles the Sino-Soviet relations with the United States.

Though there are various communication channels between the United States and the ROK, it is still possible for intentions to be misperceived by government officials on both sides. As seen in the case of Acheson, despite several events that could have helped him make an accurate assessment of Communist China, his position did not change until situations escalated to war. A constant evaluation of the mutual images held by leadership of both countries can help guide policy makers to make better decisions based on accurate data. The increasing ties between the ROK and China do not necessarily mean that the Koreans will think of Americans as the “hegemonic force that oppresses brother China.” As the image and perception of an individual affects his or her actions, the assessment of the Korean leadership’s perception of the United States, and vice versa, will contribute to an understanding in the process of making foreign policies.

¹⁴⁶ Phillip C. Saunders, “Managing a Multifaceted Relationship between the U.S.A. and China,” in *China-U.S. Relations Transformed: Perspectives and Strategic Interactions*, ed. Zhao Suicheng (New York: Routledge, 2007), 135.

¹⁴⁷ Bun-Soon Park, “Northeast Asia’s Economic Integration into China,” *SERI Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (2011): 15, http://relooney.fatcow.com/0_New_10606.pdf.

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